Abstract

The Chisumbanje ethanol investment has captured the emotions, imaginations and captivated Zimbabweans to dialogue on broader economic development and the issue of large scale land investments. Underpinning this intense dialogue are real matters of livelihoods and the meaning of land for people, balancing economic development versus resources ownership, especially for the rural communities in the vicinity of the ethanol project. Sensitivities arise when communal land becomes the target for investments, with a potential to move communities. Noise has been raised on such land possession; however, there is no consensus nor evidence of what is actually taking place on the ground in Chisumbanje. The paper explores the nature of land dislocation, land resettlement plans, compensation of the affected communities, and the nature of the contract model where communities cede or use land rights to negotiate economic benefits. The issues go beyond the technical investment, but towards better understanding of the distribution of costs and benefits to local communities, the private sector (investing companies), government (as a shareholder in private markets). The paper examines the impact of the investments on land and other resources on the local communities, which provides different nuances in Chisumbanje. In our deeper analysis we decipher whether the African Union’s (AU) Framework and Guidelines (F&G) for Land Policy in Africa of 2009, are being followed given the development of benchmarks against which to measure country performance on land governance (African Union 2009). Our analysis encompasses the core issues that require investigation on the varied land governance structures and implications for local communities, the wider economy and sustainable use of natural resources upon, which the majority of the poor depend on. Land investments such as Chisumbanje ethanol project are key to measure good land governance, which requires to be socialized not just at the national level, but at the local level where most of the actions take place. An assessment will be made on whether at grassroots there are better or worse livelihood enhancement practices, and whether the developments benefiting all or some members within the communities and does this ratio justify the existence of such an investment?

Key words: economic empowerment, conflicts, land grab, displacement, ethanol blending, contestations in sugar investment, land investment

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose and objectives

Zimbabwe’s investments in agriculture after a contested Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) underpinned by land occupations permeated by violence, which was largely contained by the state by 2005, has triggered a debated on the meaning and import of “international land grabs” (Matondi, 2015, forthcoming). The debates internationally have been increasingly, while the substance and content of it has become weak with each passing. It is in respect of the emerging trends, that we sought to decipher the meaning of “land grabs”, “international land grabs” and “agricultural investments” as these mean different things in different context. A key observation that provides contrarian in analysis, is the material fact that the FTLRP was an “internal”, instigated and implemented programme that does not conform to externally driven “land grabs” of an international nature. Based on this differentiation, this his paper sought to understand: 1) the interest and role of Zimbabwe government, and its contribution to the first large scale private investments undertaken by Green Fuel in Chisumbanje; 2) the role of the local institutions be they technical or administrative in facilitating and mediating in investment; 3) establishing the capacity of local and national institutions to structure agreements on behalf of the local communities, that would be favorable to the communities; 4) identify the role, interests and benefits of Green Fuel as domestic investors.

In order to answer these broad questions, field work at the local level in Chisumbanje was key in interfacing with the traditional leaders as representatives of the community, who also have a rich history of understanding the land ownership and transfer matters. Yet, we were also aware that through history, colonial and post-colonial land ownership has been a site of struggle by a variety of interest groups. Yet, the Green Fuel investments was not just an expression of land ownership and use, but the whole genre of economic development, and the path that agriculture needs to take into the future. Interrogating, the role of government as a land authority and its capacity to work with local communities and Green Fuel was a key aspect of this research work. Nonetheless, government functionaries, in the form of the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) with a long history in the area shape our understanding of modernization and development, it being a colonial construct of the 1960s in particular, when the Rhodesian colonial government sought strategically Import Substitution Policy, across its economy, and in particular in the energy sector where ethanol and bio-diesel became investments of necessity.

While arguments are awash that ethanol blending is not new, key questions remain because vehicle technologies have also changed. Instead of leaded fuel, unleaded was introduced because of the harmful effects of lead. Yet, engine efficiencies of vehicles improved on the basis of gasoline than blends. However, some countries notably Brazil and United States of America, as well as Europe also moved top design vehicles and kits to ensure use of ethanol blends. Therefore, newness can be redefined technologically, yet for land adopters as in African countries some of these technologies may be unavailable. This is the import, of the national political contestations over ethanol blending that during the times of the inclusive government, took the nation by storm. With the new mandatory blending to E20 policy this paper seeks to examine whether the government policies are supporting local rights and claims or whether they are in alignment with the interests of the large-scale investors. In all this, in what ways do the community and the company putting money is a perceived risk market, contribute or have an equal standing in their roles and interests being met? Are locals and the private domestic company considered to a key player with a say in the distributive issues beneficiation, and compensation for losses incurred[1]. It was this critical to examine the roles played by the various stakeholders involved the overarching question of large investments in agriculture, in a country that has seen more flight of investors than attracting them.

1.2 Framing the key questions and issues

The conceptual approach adopted for the Developmental Economy Analysis (DEA) of the large investments is an “issue or problem-driven analysis”, which comprises four conceptual components and four strategic issues, and these are: 1) Development governance: focuses on the effectiveness of the state and private sector in managing a contested policy process on ethanol as a subset of energy, and how strategies and programs were designed to implement the project effectively, solving problems as they arise, being responsive to issues and challenges faced in the project. In addition, for the project to take root, we assessed the decision making, and governmental systems and processes at play, in mediating issues that arose. The Chisumbanje project managed to build comprehensive processes of stakeholder engagement, in which positioning was critical for wider interests. An expectation of openness in the project was high on the agenda, yet private sector operates differently and is bound by ethics of not revealing its business model, like a public entity.

Yet, when working in local communities, it is paramount to take on board the views of minorities and the voices of the most vulnerable in society in decision-making; 2. The framework also took a power analysis to addresses questions on the project systems, structures and processes: Who are the drivers/blockers to large investments and why? Who sets the policy agenda? Whose ideas and values dominate policy? Who gets what, when, and how? How do formal institutions shape the distribution of costs and benefits? How do informal social networks shape policy processes? Power analysis places emphasis on understanding the formal and informal development landscape. It acknowledges aspects of context such as culture, convention, and systems of shared belief. Cast in a framework of broader development, power falls in five categories: 1) economic mobilization and winning support for project; 2) use of soft forms of lobby to get benefits; 3) use of technical skills to induce economic opportunities; 4) control of economic institutions for beneficiation; and 5) control of knowledge and information.

1.3 Data collection methods

· Overview: Questions, which required qualitative approaches, included: can household livelihood change be attributed to the land investments or something else? What choices of livelihood activities and production strategies are now in place? What are the effects of the land investments on detrimental risk coping strategies, and what are the attitudes to risk change as a consequence of the land investments? What are the main constraints (whether linked to networks, physical access, etc.) faced by households in engaging in labour ties in Green Fuel’s activities and how do these influence behaviours and choices? At the local economy level, the qualitative methods enabled us to answer questions on how the local community, are benefitting or not economically from the investment through multiplier effects of new income streams on local goods, services and labour markets, although these are being mediated by the political, economic and social context. At the social networks level, we intended to establish how land investments increase beneficial risk sharing arrangements and economic collaboration underpinned by social capital (trust- based reciprocity). Through qualitative approaches we were able to answer some of the following questions: What were social networks like before the land investments and how did they relate to livelihoods? How are existing social and support networks affected by the land investments? What is the importance placed upon changing social networks by community members (i.e. is the fact that networks are being affected by the land investments considered ‘important’ by people in the community)? How is this traded off against other programme impacts (i.e. do the overall benefits from the income gained for instance in Chisumbanje make up for any negative social effects that may arise)? Which networks are most affected and why? Which are the strongest networks and why? Has the investments triggered the creation of new networks? If so, how? Which ones? Is there an increase in networks that extend beyond the reference community? What effect does this have on social relationships?

· Field research protocols:The field research protocol was a very hard exercise due to the political nature of the investment under study. We started by sending letters of request from the Ministry of Agriculture Mechanization and Irrigation Development, Ministry of Local Government and Public Housing, Ministry of Energy and Power Development and it took three months for us to get the authorisation from these ministries. When we got the authorisation we went to the Provincial Administrator, Manicaland, the District Administrator, Chipinge District, Chief Garahwa, the police in Chisumbanje, the MP for Chisumbanje, local councillors in Chisumbanje, the President’s Office in Chisumbanje as our entry points before we approached the Headmen for the various villages. However, this rigorous exercise served as a policy influence as all those approached are key in policy influencing on the investment.

· Approaches in the field: The research used a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches. The research team offered the most comprehensive design of qualitative survey to generate new knowledge at 3 levels: household, local economy and livelihoods, and social networks. At the household level, the quantitative methods allowed us to answer some of these questions on how the land investment is assumed to improve the livelihood choices and productive investments. One hundred and twenty questionnaires were administered in Chinyamukwakwa and Chisumbanje (60 in Chinyamukwakwa and 60 in Chisumbanje). Middle Sabi was isolated as there are no people affected by the land grabs as Rating Investments (the company that is growing sugarcane in Middle Sabi) has resorted to the 3500ha original ARDA land in Middle Sabi. Through qualitative approaches; (4 Focus Group Discussions, 3 in Chisumbanje, 1 in Chinyamukwakwa, 10 business interviews (3 in Chinyamukwakwa and 7 at Checheche) targeting the informal sector, formal and banking; observations in-depth interviews and personalised stories; and informal/off the record interviews, we established how and why local communities are making decisions on livelihoods through examining the changes brought by land investments.

· Official interviews: We had interviews with the CEO of Chipinge Rural District Council, the local Member of Parliament for Chipinge South, Cde Enock Porusingazi, Assistant General Manager, Green Fuels, Rafael Zuze, Community Officer-Green Fuels, Ropafadzo Gwanetsa, Headman Chisumbanje, and Chief Garahwa. We tried in vain to have an interview with the Chairman of ARDA, Mr Basil Nyabadza who initially agreed for an interview with us but later withdrew without giving any reasons. A scheduled interview with the District Administrator for Chipinge also failed to take off due to the politics associated with the project. After the interview with green Fuel officials which we felt they did not open up, we posted a blog on the internet and they got hold of it felt the blog was one sided and proposed that we meet them and discuss a possible return to the field. We then met with Nicole Mollet who is the Community Social Responsibility Manager at Green Fuel (who is also wife to the new General Manager, Conrad Rautenbach, son to Conrad “Billy” Rautenbach-the investor). She arranged for our return to Chisumbanje and we had a tour of the sugar cane fields and a tour of the plant where we had interview with the SHE Manager at Green Fuel, an agronomist with Green Fuel, the Manager for Small Scale Irrigation Schemes, and the Community Officer, Ropafadzo Gwanetsa who gave us a full interview on agriculture and production.

1.4 Background to the study and the field site

To date, Zimbabwe has not developed a comprehensive national agricultural policy. However, an overall vision has been outlined, which is “to promote development of an efficient, competitive and sustainable agriculture sector, which assures food security and increased income.”[2] In line with this vision, the agricultural sector policy that is being formulated aims to increase production for both household and national food security; increase funding for agricultural infrastructure and the sector; improve produce quality; improve production technology; preserve natural resources; and effectively manage and administrate land reform. The Hippo Valley Estates is protected by the Hippo Valley Act that was drawn up in November 1964 between the Rhodesian government and Sir Raymond Stockil representing the company. The government, through a Crown Charter, ceded 70 872 morgen of land to Hippo Valley to develop an irrigation scheme. A Dutch morgen is about 0, 85 hectares. The government cannot under the current legal regime compulsorily acquire land owned by the company. The repealing of the Hippo Valley Act will empower the government to acquire the land including infrastructure and equipment on the farms. The Chisumbanje and Middle Sabi Estates are protected by the ARDA Act as the land belongs to ARDA and it is a partnership between ARDA and Macdom and Rating Investments.

The Chisumbanje project is a public-private partnership between the government through the parastatal Agriculture and Rural Development Authority (ARDA), and local investors Green Fuel with subsidiary companies (Macdom and Ratings Pvt Ltd.). The project utilizes ARDA estates to grow sugarcane for ethanol blending. The Chisumbanje Ethanol Plant (Green Fuels) is a joint venture operation between Macdom Investments (Zimbabwean private investment company owned by Billy Conrad Rautenbach, a white Zimbabwe who was born and grew up in Zimbabwe) and the government of Zimbabwe represented by its Agricultural investment arm ARDA. It started as Built-Operate-Transfer and later on changed to a joint venture. ARDA owns the land whilst two companies, Macdom Investments in Chisumbanje and Rating Investments in Middle Sabi provide for the sugar cane to Green Fuels which then produces the ethanol.[3] Government through ARDA invested US$36, 7 in land and immovable assets and Macdom Investments injected the capital and holds 90% stake in Green Fuel whilst the government has got 10% stake. The total investment into Green Fuel is US$300 million rather than the US$600 being said in the media and the machine was imported from Brazil.[4] The proprietors of Green Fuel point out that the company fulfils the Indigenization Policy requirement of 51/49 ratio (state/external investors) as well as the 10% community ownership scheme which most investments have complied or have put in place plans to comply with the regulations.

The study explored the political and policy positioning of the project at the national level, in terms of the power play, the actors and the implications of the investment for the national economy and related controversial issues around consumer behavior on the final product (blended fuel) that has received mixed reactions, but has been legislated and whose level of blending has been staggered at policy. While the Green Fuel was the key player, from the beginning of the year, the government opened up to other companies, hence the Chiredzi sugar production cluster has re-joined ethanol blending as well, thus in a way liberalizing the production and marketing of blended fuel with scope for inducing competitiveness. The implication of this liberation is yet to be assessed. However, most of our research focused in the areas of production of sugarcane and it’s processing, in future we equally need to trace the governance of the sugarcane value chain to identify the actors winning and those loosing, with a view for advocacy to limit damage on the poor.

2. LARGE SCALE SUGARCANE INVESTMENTS FROM A GLOBAL AND NATIONAL LENS

2.1 Land, agriculture and investments guidelines

2.1.1 International guidelines and relevance for Zimbabwe

Of the major initiatives taken lately at an international level to regulate large-scale land deals, is the formulation of international guidelines including the World Bank Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment; the FAO Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests as well as; the Minimum Core Human Rights Principles of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food. The FAO Voluntary Guideline on the Responsible Governance of Tenure, endorsed by the Committee on World Food Security in May 2012, is a widely publicized and the most recent global initiative for the regulation of land tenure in general and large-scale farm investments in particular. The FAO guideline is more inclusive than the World Bank principles in its formulation process (White et al., 2012); it is also a lot more ‘holistic’ in its approach whereby land rights are characterized of being “inextricably linked with access to and management of other natural resources” (Preface of the FAO Voluntary Guidelines, 2012). This is an important approach in the context of the Chisumbanje Ethanol investment wherein loss of land use rights by local communities has brought about a wide range of consequences in terms of loss of access to various other natural resources, including water, grazing lands and forest woods, on which local livelihoods highly depended.

In Zimbabwe there remains no clear land policy to guide land administration. The Chisumbanje Ethanol Investment provide an example of ad hoc land administration, there is no clarity on how it fits into the wider context of land reform which supports small holder commercial agriculture. One possible way of enforcing of such voluntary international guidelines is through their incorporation into national laws which then give rise to statutory rights and responsibilities. This however reinforces the state-centric approach in the governance of land deals; since it gives the ultimate discretion for states to decide on whether or not to incorporate such principles into state law, and thus opt for or against their applicability.

2.1.2 Critique of the guideline for responsible investment and their application to Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe is not a signatory to the international guidelines and principles and the principles do not reflect that the current expansion of large scale agro-investments most often takes place in competition with smallholder agriculture for land and water and lead to conflicts with and alienation and displacement of rural populations. Large scale agro-investments are highly mechanized and require little labour. In addition they promote monoculture and the undermining of biological diversity. A fundamental problem with large scale agro-investments, as evidenced by research from Latin America, are that their technical, agro-ecological, economic and social features make them unable to promote sustainable development (Fernandes et al. 2012; Coulson 2013).

In essence, the rai principles take the high moral ground in arguing for protection of smallholders, the environment and the climate but make no attempt to operationalise the principles by placing responsibilities with different types of investors. Hence some agro-investors, e.g. that are large scale, may not fully understand how the principles relate to their activities and may not feel sufficiently challenged by the principles to act in their spirit. Recent research show, however, that African states, instead of protecting and supporting their own smallholders, have been more inclined to align themselves with large-scale investors and agri-business, both foreign and domestic (Matondi et al. 2011; Coulson 2013).

The rai principles, which are voluntary, are insufficient to address the real problems and challenges unfolding in relation to different types of agricultural investments. This is mainly due to lack of operationalisation in terms of targeting or placing responsibilities of various implications of agro-investments with different categories of investors. Rai will therefore have problems in relating to real issues on the ground and in particular to conflicts between different scales of agricultural investment. These features of rai are likely to render them ineffective in promoting responsible agro-investments. The draft rai remains inside the frame of the dominant states and regions and will be unable to challenge their drive and support for large scale agro-investments. As to smallholders, the draft rai emphasises protection, not support and development. Hence attention is taken away from the important potential that smallholder agriculture regimes have for enhancing food security, nutrition and sustainable development.

2.1.3 National guidelines

Zimbabwe last developed its land policy in the 1990s with an objective of redistributing about 5 miillion hectares of commercial land for resettlement on a willing buyer willing seller basis. There were various attempts of revising the policy at the end of the 1990s without success but the programme for land transfere continued anyway, which facilitated engagement between civil society, government, funding agencies and the international community towards developing a programme of ressettlement, but this was overtaken by event, leading to FTLR. Government have to rely on a raft of legal instruments and constitutional ammendments to effect FTRL because it had no policy underpining it. And these legal instruments became de facto policy but limited only to land as as resource, less importance was placed on fisheries, conservancies because key priority was transfer of land from those with the land to those without, but all done internally. Therefore, though the international guidelines were developed in principle, hardly do they speak to Zimbabwe land reform, besides they speak to issues around energy, food security, income all with specific policies therefore harmonising them with land will be something nice to to do.

The Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority (ZERA) is the legal entity that issued Green Fuel with a blending license in August 2013. The Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority (ZERA) was created in September 2011 following the promulgation of the Energy Regulatory Act (Chapter 13:23) which provides for regulation of the energy sector and other sections not provided for by the energy laws, the Electricity Act (13:19) and Petroleum Act (13:22). The Energy Regulatory Act repealed some sections especially those related to the formation of the regulatory institutions in the Electricity Act (Chapter 13:19) and Petroleum Act (Chapter 13:22). The mandate of ZERA is to regulate the Energy Sector in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority says mandatory E10 ethanol fuel blend is safe for all petrol cars but was silent on the effects of E15 and E20 on engines and automobiles’ performances. Government introduced mandatory E10 blending with effect from October 15 2014. ZERA commissioned a Consultancy for Development of a Fuel Quality and Bio Fuels Policy Framework and initial recommendations are that use of current levels of ethanol blends is safe. The study also identified risks and mitigation strategies to deal with higher blending levels targeting the Zimbabwean fleet. Other regulatory institutions that have a role in the Chisumbanje ethanol project include, the Environmental Management Agency-that supervise the whether an environmental assessment programme has been carried out before the establishment of the plant, the National Social Security Authority (NSSA) whose mandate is to ensure social security for the workers at the plant.

2.2 Enforcement and mediating institutions for responsible investments

2.2.1 State institutional framework

The main parastatal that is involved in the Chisumbanje Ethanol Investment is the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) that is the government’s agricultural development parastatal under the Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanization and Irrigation Development (MoAMID). ARDA was formed in 1965 with its major role to boost agricultural production and rural development as well as productive utilization of State land. ARDA through MoAMID was central in the initial offer of land on a lease basis to Zimbabwe Bio-Energy Company, which in the case of Chisumbanje trade as Green Fuels. Yet, all land is owned by the state and administered by the Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement (MLRR), which to date has not provided a statement on the Chisumbanje project, this ostensibly, because the land is statutorily owned by MoAMID.

2.2.2 Local institutional structures

The land that the ethanol project is falls under the jurisdiction of the Chipinge Rural District Council and they are a key stakeholder in the process because in terms of the laws of the country that is communal land that is administered by the local authority. The role of the local authority comes in on the land; if the company needs to expand they need to engage the Chipinge Rural District Council as they are the land authority. The allocation of the 0.5ha to the farmers who lost their land is a process which involves the Rural District Council, the company, Agritex and the Department of Irrigation in the Ministry of Agriculture and allocation was based on those that lost their land during expansion. When the investment expanded into the Chisumbanje area, which is communal, but earmarked for the ethanol project, that is when the 0.5ha compensation were factored in. According to the Chipinge Rural District Council, the people knew that the area was earmarked for expansion and no one build houses in the land they cultivated. The settler farmers have got leases with the Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement and Council has leased the land where ARDA or now Macdom is occupying and the 0.5ha small scale schemes.

2.2.3 Traditional leaders

Chief Garahwa noted that when Green Fuel came in, they made promises to him as a chief and to the community as a whole, which they are now not fulfilling and the investment is no longer benefiting the community as promised when the company came in. According to Chief Garahwa problems aroused when ARDA invaded peoples land, when it was common knowledge that ARDA had its own land which was fenced and everyone knew the boundaries. During the process of the invasion of people’s land, the company destroyed crops which were ready for harvesting. Though these crops were compensated, it was not to the delight of the local people. Headman Chisumbanje presiding over 16 villages with 10 of the 16 affected by the land displacement carried out by Macdom Investments, pointed out that people used to grow maize for food and cotton as a cash crop and we were able to build our houses using proceeds from cotton. During better seasons we would sell excess grain to the GMB. Now that most families have lost their land we can no longer grow food and cotton for sale, even our cattle do not have anywhere to graze. However, the Chief and the Headman admitted that they were consulted on behalf of the community and that is why he carried a traditional ceremony to bless the investment and has been taking all the problems that have risen to the District Administrator.

2.2.4 Farmer organizations and commodity associations

There are four farmer organizations in Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe Farmers Union, Zimbabwe Commercial Farmer Union, Commercial Farmers Union and the National Farmers Union of Zimbabwe who all represent farmer interests in Zimbabwe and have got farmers under their association in Chisumbanje. However, they do not have farmers they represent who are producing sugar cane in Chisumbanje neither do they support the farmers in Chisumbanje on sugar production. However in an interview with CFU, they feel that the project is a fantastic project with a good potential and is a great investment of national strategic importance. The CFU pointed out that the project can be made perfect by creating small scale satellite sugar cane farmers who will then supply the company with sugar cane.

In the sugar sector, there are three farmer associations registered with the Sugar Association that represent the interests of the private sugar cane farmers, namely: the Zimbabwe Sugar Cane Development Association, the Commercial Sugar Cane Farmers of Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe Cane Farmers Association. The “Successful Rural Sugar Cane Farming Community project” (SusCo) aimed at rehabilitating private farmers to increase their supply of sugar cane is still on-going. The project is supported by Tongaat Hulett and funded by a local bank. It seeks to accelerate the private farmer sugarcane re-planting in order to increase sugar cane output from this sector to the potential of 1.4 MMT from 15,880 hectares by 2015.

2.2.5 Civil society players and consumer organizations

The Platform for Youth Development (PYD) is the most significant pressure group that has been “fighting for the rights of the community” in Chisumbanje. Platform for Youth Development has been working with the villagers on this matter since 2008. PYD has engaged Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights who filed a court application at the high court of Zimbabwe to stop Macdom Pvt Ltd and her sister companies from encroaching the boundaries they have since agreed with ARDA. PYD was also involved in the now defunct District Ethanol Production Committee (DEPIC) with its Chairman/Director being the spokesperson of DEPIC. International civil society players from Switzerland, FEPA, KASA and SOLIFONDS petitioned the ethanol investor, Green Fuel and its owner Billy Rautenbach to respect and honor existing land boundaries and ensure that the local Chisumbanje and Chinyamukwakwa villagers continue to survive and feed their families. FEPA, KASA, SOLIFONDS and other partners urged Rautenbach to respect dialogue with Chisumbanje and Chinyamukwakwa communities as a way of solving the existing land conflict.

3. GENESIS OF ETHANOL PRODUCTION IN ZIMBABWE: PACESETTERS AND RISK TAKERS

3.1 Sugar production sector and ethanol production

3.1.1 Historical antecedent

Thomas Murray Macdougall grew the ﬁrst sugarcane at Triangle Limited around 1934. The ﬁrst settler farmers were introduced to Triangle in 1954. In 1956, Sir Roy Stockil formed Hippo Valley Estates Limited and farmed sugarcane. Settler farmers were introduced in Hippo Valley between 1960 and 1964. Both Triangle Limited and Hippo Valley Estates Limited are in Chiredzi District, which is Masvingo Province today. In 1962, the Zimbabwe Cane Farmers Association[5] was established to coordinate the common interests of independent, non-miller sugarcane farmers. Today, there are three growers’ associations representing approximately 1 000 independent non miller sugarcane farmers, namely: Zimbabwe Cane Farmers Association [ZCFA], Commercial Sugarcane Farmers Association of Zimbabwe [CSFAZ], and Zimbabwe Sugarcane Development Association [ZSDA]. The independent outgrowers farm approximately 16 000 ha of sugarcane. In 1963, the Zimbabwe Sugar Association [ZSA][6] was formed to represent the interest of sugarcane growers, millers, and sugar reﬁneries. In 1963, Zimbabwe Sugar Sales Pvt Ltd [ZSS] was established to market all raw sugar, and today markets both raw and processed sugar produced by the millers. In 1974, Triangle and Hippo Valley purchased Mkwasine Estate and converted part of it to growing sugarcane. By 1980, 1 910 hectares of Mkwasine Estate was sold to 191 small scale and 1 290 hectares to eight large scale sugarcane outgrowers. Triangle Limited established Mwenezana Estates in Mwenezi District, Masvingo Province, to grow sugarcane on about 4 000 hectares. The Zimbabwe sugar industry developed rapidly. The Lowveld area proved to be ideal for sugarcane cultivation, with good alluvial soils and semi-arid continental climate. . Sustained production of sugarcane would occur subject to the availability of adequate water for irrigation. To this end the Sugar Industry, in conjunction with the Government, invested in extensive irrigation systems, including the construction of Mutirikwi and Manjirenji dams and canals to harness water provided by five major rivers that traverse through the Lowveld.

The production and use of biofuels in the form of ethanol has been a part of Zimbabwe for over decades in what could be described as an “on-off relationship”. As early as the 1960’s, the country has been documented to have been utilising ethanol for blending. The Zimbabwean government began the ethanol project in 1963 (when it was still Rhodesia) and continued when it attained independence in 1980, it continued blending ethanol with petrol until 1992 when the severe drought and (Shumba et al, 2010) due to uncompetitiveness price wise with gasoline from the Middle East that had gotten to be much more cheaper production wise and at landing cost on Harare. This reduced the production of both ethanol and sugar to nearly zero (Mutanga et. al, 2013). The ethanol production was motivated by the international sanctions imposed on the former Rhodesian authority, security of supply, foreign currency savings and low sugar prices. In 1975 Triangle Sugar Pvt Ltd decided to use surplus molasses from up to 40 000tonnes of sugar for ethanol production and started production in 1979. A German Company, Gerbr Hermman, supplied the plant design at a cost of US$6.4 million capable of producing 40 million litres a year.

In 2005, for the same reason and conditions (as in the Rhodesian era) ethanol was reintroduced. On the 8^th of June 2006, through National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM), Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) entered into an agreement with Triangle Sugar Pvt Ltd for the production and delivery of ethanol to NOCZIM for fuel blending. Ethanol production at Triangle stands at 25 million litres a year, with 5 million litres used internally by the company and leaving 20 million available for blending-falling short of the national requirement for blending at 10% of imported fossil fuels which requires about 100 million litres per annum. In 2007, serious plans to moot the production of ethanol from sugar cane were mooted through a private public partnership between the government and Zimbabwe Bio-Energy Company in Mwenezi. The project dragged on and on and has not yet been established.

The year 2011 was to be the dawn of yet another new chapter in Zimbabwe’s relentless pursuit of the seemingly highly elusive biofuels programme. A US$ 300 million ethanol plant project was established at Chisumbanje in the Chipinge District of Manicaland province. The plant was set up on a joint venture partnership between the GoZ, Agricultural Rural Development Agency (ARDA), and a private investor, Green Fuels Pvt (Ltd), with producing companies in Chisumbanje being Macdom Pvt Ltd, and Ratings Pvt Ltd in Middle Sabi. On the 6th of February 2012, the plant shut down its operation (Bulawayo 24, 1 May 2012) citing numerous challenges which it was facing putting 4,500 workers at the risk of losing their jobs. Some of the problems that have been highlighted in different press reports include failure to secure a ready market for its ethanol as government had not made fuel blending mandatory (Bulawayo 24, 1 May 2012). This consequently led to a situation where there was an accumulation of the ethanol stock at the plant as it was not selling. However, the government in 2013 gazette Statutory Instrument 17 of 2013 (Mandatory Blending of Anhydrous Ethanol with Unleaded Petrol) which was published on the 12th of February 2013. The instrument stipulates that all licensed procurers and wholesalers of unleaded fuel must only do so after ensuring it has been blended with a minimum 10% of ethanol (E10) produced by a licensed producer.

3.1.2 Resource base and ownership

Sugarcane in Zimbabwe is produced in the south-eastern lowveld area partly embedded in Masvingo and Manicaland Provinces under irrigation. There are three groups of sugar cane producers: the large estates, large scale farmers and newly resettled farmers. Three large estates, Triangle (for sugar and ethanol production), Hippo Valley (for sugar production) and Green Fuel (for ethanol production only) have about 53,500 hectares of sugar cane land and produce in excess of 3.0 Million Metric Tonnes (MMT) of sugar cane or approximately 80 percent of the total cane crop. Tongaat Hulett, a large South African agricultural and agro-processing business, wholly owns Triangle Estates and has 50.3 percent shareholding in Hippo Valley[7]. Large scale farmers and newly resettled farmers collectively produce 20 percent of the crop.

In the 2011/12 MY, Tongaat Hulett together with a local bank established a four year US$20 million loan revolving facility to enhance sugar cane production growth. The project is currently providing inputs on loan to at least 670 of the 872 newly resettled sugar cane farmers. The private cane farmers are receiving assistance with tillage services, cane replanting and extension services to improve cane yields and extractable sugar content. Cane yield per hectare, however, is expected to increase as good summer rains from December 2013 to March 2014, improved the availability of irrigation water in supply dams.[8] In the 2013/14 MY, Zimbabwe harvested 3.9 MMT of sugar cane on 46,605 hectares, marginally less than the 4.0 MMT on 53,486 hectares. The marginal decrease in cane production was mainly due to the effects of the 2012/13 drought that reduced the rate of cane expansion and root replanting.

3.1.3 Sugarcane Contribution to the Economy

Zimbabwe's economy is dependent on agricultural products including tobacco, cotton and sugar cane. Major export commodities are tobacco and horticulture. Other crops like sugar, tea, coffee, cotton, seeds, maize, small grains and oilseeds are also exported. The sector is an important contributor to the country’s export activities, with markets in America, Europe, Africa and the Far East. According to Scoones et al (2010), the sugar industry has been the mainstay of the lowveld’s economy; the industry has produced significant foreign exchange for the national exchequer not to mention employment, ethanol and various industrial products.[9]

According to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Zimbabwe’s sugar cane production is projected to fall by 3% in MY 2014/15 to 3.8 million tonnes, due to a 12% drop in the area harvested. It notes that improved yields prevented a more dramatic fall, and that as a result overall sugar production in Zimbabwe is expected to fall by just 8,000 tonnes, to 480,000 tonnes. Around 80% of sugar cane produced comes from the Triangle and Hippo Valley estates, in which Tongaat Hulett enjoys a 100% and 50.3% shareholding, respectively. The remaining sugar cane production comes from Green Fuel, large-scale farmers and newly resettled farmers. The Successful Rural Sugar Cane Farming Community project aims to expand farmer-supplied cane from 800,000 to 1,400,000 tonnes, on the basis of a loan-financed revolving fund supported by Tongaat Hulett, and a local bank and technical services (tillage cane replanting extension support), designed to improve cane yields and sucrose content.

Since 2010/11, Zimbabwean sugar production has increased by 44%, from 333,000 to 480,000 tonnes, with yields per hectare increasing by 40%, from 6.2 to 93 t/ha. Sucrose extraction has also grown in the last 2 years. Total sugar consumption in Zimbabwe declined slightly in 2013/14 to 340,000 tonnes.

However, sales of locally produced sugar were reduced to 180,000 tonnes in the face of increased imports from lower-priced world market suppliers, which reached 124,639 tonnes. These imports also pushed down local sugar prices (wholesale prices −18%; retail prices −11%). Imports largely originated from South Africa (64,570 tonnes of refined and 41,468 tonnes of raw sugar) with small volumes of raw sugar imported from Malawi (2,460 tonnes) and Zambia (1,796 tonnes); 7,447 tonnes of raw sugar and 6,898 tonnes of refined sugar were imported from beyond Southern Africa. In response to this situation, from “17 January 2014 the government effectively stopped all sugar imports, except for importation of white manufacturers grade sugar for the beverage industry”. In 2014/15, Zimbabwean exports to the EU are expected to remain at about 200,000 tonnes, the same level as in 2013/14.

Zimbabwe: Sugar production, consumption, imports, exports and ending stocks (tonnes)

	MY 2012/13	MY 2013/14	MY 2014/15
Sugar production	475,000	488,000	480,000
Human consumption	389,000	340,000	350,000
Total imports	78,000	124,000	10
Raw exports	201,000	200,000	200,000
Ending stocks	70,000	142,000	82,000

Source: USDA [10]

3.2 Pacesetters and new risk takers

3.2.1 Triangle Limited

Triangle Limited is an agri-based sugar company and is wholly owned by The Tongaat Hulett Group. Murray MacDougall, assisted by Tom Dunuza founded the company in 1919 to ranch cattle but a severe downturn in the economy during the post World War 1 recession led Triangle into crop production in the late 1920s. The main crop cultivated was wheat but Triangle started growing sugar cane in 1934 with only 18 hectares under irrigation. The first sugar-processing mill in Zimbabwe was opened at Triangle on 11 September 1939. Numerous problems followed, which saw the Government taking over the company in 1944. In 1954 a South African company, the Natal Syndicate purchased Triangle, only to be taken over in 1957 by Guy Hulett who was running a business consortium in Natal. This marked the beginning of the Tongaat Hulett association with Triangle. Triangle's expansion was started in the early 1960's, with the development of water storage and conveyance infrastructures for the irrigation of sugar cane. The Triangle operation is the biggest sugar operation in Zimbabwe, with crushing capacity of around 2.5M tonnes of cane per year and producing up to 300,000 tonnes of raw sugar per year. In addition, an alcohol plant attached to the sugar factory produces up to 25M litres of industrial grade rectified spirit from molasses annually, for sale predominantly into the regional market. The alcohol plant takes the final molasses from the sugar production operation and then through a fermentation process followed by distillation and molecular sieve dehydration. This process produces fuel grade alcohol at a rate of 120,000 litres per day.[11] Triangle also established Mwenezana Sugar Estates in Mwenezi District, Masvingo Province to grow sugar cane on about 4000 hectares.

3.2.2 Hippo Valley Estates

Hippo Valley Estate was established in 1956 as a citrus estate and soon it diversified with the first cane planted three years later in 1959. Canned Hippo Valley fruit was exported across southern Africa until the 1970s. In the wake of the sugar marker crush in 1975, the estate initiated irrigation programs to water its sugar plantations. In 2006 Anglo American sold its 50.4 percent stake in Hippo Valley Estates to Triangle Sugar, the Zimbabwean unit of Tongaat-Hulett. Hippo Valley, the country’s second largest operation, is listed on the local bourse. The company produces approximately 50% of the local sugar industry output and has a mill with an annual capacity of about 2.4m tonnes of cane at an average cane: sugar ratio of 8:1. Hippo can also produce up to 300,000 tonnes of raw sugar during a year of normal rainfall. In addition to sugar, the mill produces molasses, which is a by-product of the process. Molasses is used as an ingredient for stock feed and for the production of alcohol. The baggasse produced during the milling season is used for the generation of electricity, producing at most 30 megawatts at optimum capacity.[12]

3.2.3 Mkwasine Estates, Chapiwa and Mpapa

Mkwasine -- which measures over 8 200 hectares, was previously owned by a consortium run by the two Lowveld sugar cane growing giants, Triangle and Hippo Valley Estates. It was then acquired by the government under the fast Track Land Reform Programme with the acquisition being part of the Government's thrust to find ways of increasing the sugar production. Mkwasine Estates was acquired under the land reform programme as part of deliberate moves by Government to open up the lucrative sugar cane farming industry to indigenous people. At the moment, there are over 200 resettled sugar cane farmers. Mpapa has 17 farmers with 35ha each and Chapiwa is a resettled scheme where the farmers have 10ha each.

3.2.4 Chisumbanje and Middle Sabi Estates (Green Fuel)

The land that Green Fuel’s sugar cane is cultivated on belongs to the Agricultural Rural Development Authority of Zimbabwe (ARDA). ARDA was formed in 1981 under the Zimbabwean Ministry of Agriculture, Development and Irrigation with the aim of merging several different government authorities into one body. ARDA’s core focus is on the development of community farming by providing education and management services to small-scale farmers on both communal land and property purchased by the government. There are 6000ha under sugar cane at Chisumbanje Estates (Macdom) with a potential of 45 000ha to be put under sugar cane for ethanol production. The Middle Sabi Estate (Rating) account for 3 500ha under sugar cane.

The major source of water for the plant is Osborne Dam which is an earth embankment dam, creating a reservoir with a surface area of 2600 hectares, storing 400,000 mega litres on the Odzi River, a tributary of the Save River. The catchment area is 1392 km² the embankment is 66 metres high, crest length 1007 metres and the volume of earth in the embankment is 5.1 Million cubic metres. The spillway is the "drop inlet" type with a crest radius of 15.7 metres, a 6 metre diameter shaft and conduit conveys the overflow to the flip bucket. However, there are plans for the construction of Kondo dam as there are challenges in water supply.

There have been disagreements between Green Fuel and the Zimbabwe National Water Authority, with the company being disconnected over failure to pay for the water supplies. The community has also been in disagreements with the company over the distribution of water in the 0.5 irrigation schemes where the community claim that the company prioritise their own use at the expense of the community. The company has built the Matombo Dam Reservoir for the community irrigation schemes but sometimes the community go for months without water in the schemes.

4. CONTESTATIONS IN SUGAR INVESTMENTS IN CHISUMBANJE

4.1 Acquisition of land in communal areas

The Chisumbanje ethanol project is a unique project in that it acts contrary to the Fast track Land Reform Program that took land from white farmers for re-distribute to the black poor farmers, the state has supported the removal of rural households from what the people of Chisumbanje consider their communal farming land (Thondhana 2014). Biofuels development activities have acquired communal land, despite the fact that such land is integrated into rural communities livelihood practices, which depend on agriculture and natural resources (Cotula and Vermeulen 2009). This trajectory of land acquisition is in sharp contrast with the new wave of twenty first century global land reform, which aimed to redress insecurities from colonial policies that arose in the twentieth century (Hall 2011). Among the fundamental concerns was the land that falls under communal land was acquired by the private investors for commercial purposes.

There are concerns in the manner in which the private investor acquired land under customary use and ownership for the investment. Most displaced farmers reported that they were neither consulted nor formally advised about the land acquisition agreements or before the land clearance commenced. On the sidelines of the political discussion, community issues ranged from allegations of forced relocation of families to the failure of providing fair compensation for the land taken by the project – including those under the state agency ARDA. At the height of the crisis between the company and the communities in Chisumbanje and Chinyamukwakwa, Cabinet set up the District Ethanol Project Implementation Committee (Depic) comprising traditional chiefs, area legislators, the district administrator, councilors, police, members of the President’s office, and community representatives, including NGOs (Platform for Youth Development). The Depic was working towards resolving problems between the company and the communities.

4.2 Displacement discourse and its contestation

It is alleged that most displaced farmers complained that they were neither consulted nor formally advised about the land acquisition agreements or before the land clearance commenced (Focused Group Discussion, Chisumbanje, May 2014). The coming of Green Fuel is said to have seen one thousand and eight (1008) farmers losing their land that ranged from 2ha-40ha to the company and out of the 1008 from Chisumbanje; only 172 farmers were compensated with 0.5ha irrigation schemes per family.[13] A key informant interviewee noted that:

The coming of Green Fuel saw one thousand and eight (1008) farmers losing their land that ranged from 2ha-40ha to the company and out of the 1008 from Chisumbanje; only 172 farmers were compensated with 0.5ha irrigation schemes per family. The company had slashed down crops that belonged to the farmers during land clearance and takeover and only compensated the farmers with US$3.00/ha. Now the community is failing to send their children to school because they do not have the land to till and have no jobs. The few who have been employed are not being paid up; employees at Green fuel have gone for more than three months without pay despite the company now selling the ethanol produced.”[14]

The interviewee then pointed out that the community was failing to send their children to school because they do not have the land to till and have no jobs, the few who have been employed are not being paid up; employees at Green fuel have gone for more than three months without pay despite the company now selling the ethanol produced.[15] However, the consultations were confirmed to the chief, Chief Garahwa and the Chipinge Rural District Council, and the ethanol project went ahead without the people’s approval. According to Chief Garahwa, though the company brought about irrigation schemes as compensation to those that lost their land several problems bedevil the whole issue.

“The first issue is that the people here are not used to irrigation plots hence the reluctance to accept such plots and in the beginning people were resisting such. The second issue is an issue of compensation itself, those that lost their crops were not adequately compensated and out of the over 1000 people that lost their land in Chisumbanje only 172 were compensates with the 0.5ha irrigation plots. We expect the investment to benefit the community to a greater extend since it took land away from the community changing the livelihood patterns of the local people. However this seems not to be happening as the company is no-longer fulfilling its promises. My people expected to be involved in the sugar cane production as out growers or contract farmers, but as of now only a few people are involved in sugar cane production as outgrowers and I have been asking the company to provide me with a list of the outgrowers but nothing has been done so far. As the Chief I recommend the company to go back to the promises they made from the beginning and improve on their relationship with the community for the investment is of national strategic importance.”[16]

What shocked the community was that the company “acquired 40 000ha” of land that included land belonging to settlers who had valid lease agreements with ARDA and land that belonged to the community under communal land without any form of consultation, and asked about the lack of consultation in a meeting that was between the company and the community, the Green Fuel Assistant General Manger, Raphael Zuze, said, “What do you have that we were to consult you and who are you? We consulted the chief and the DA!”[17] According to the local MP, to enter into the joint agreement, the company used correct channels, those who matter were approached. People knew the boundaries of ARDA, ARDA did not have sufficient resources to utilize the land and villagers occupied the idle land and ARDA simply reclaimed its land. Even the greater Chisumbanje plan showed need for expansion. That is why people did not build in the estate, they only did farming. However, people were not given adequate notice, an all stakeholders meeting was supposed to have been conducted, and no enough notification was given.[18] There was also the use of intimidation and disrespectful attitude of the investor supported by state agencies such as the police (Thondhlana 2014).

4.3 Conflicts over land allocation to communities

In Chipinge the conflict involves Agriculture and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) in partnership with Green Fuels versus communal as well as resettled farmers who have land offer letters on ARDA land. Some of the issues at the center of the conflict include displacement, poor resettlement plans where the communities have been allocated a uniform 0.5 ha per family which is not adequate for others and compensation of households that lost crops in the process of developing the project’s dams and canals. The owners of the project at Chisumbanje have tried to involve and compensate the farmers who lost their land. Macdom Investment set aside 0.5 ha irrigated portions of land for smallholder farmers to engage in horticulture projects to compensate for their losses. The company provides the farmers with irrigation services and gives them logistical support. Furthermore, 241 farmers are also contracted by the company to grow sugarcane, which they sell to the company.

4.4 Conflicts over “favourable” land allocation to war veterans

There are 6000ha of land under sugar cane in Chisumbanje Estate (Macdom Investments) where there are 116 outgrowers under 410 ha of land and 125 war veterans under 250ha of land.^{^[19]}The company then buys sugar cane from the farmers at US $4/tone and the expected yield per hectare is 135tonnes. In Middle Sabi, the company is utilizing 3500ha of original ARDA land with no displacement of the community, and there is a plan to develop 6000ha in Middle Sabi for the out grower scheme under the A2 model.^{^[20]} The allocation of “significant” amount of land seem to be interpreted by communities that Green Fuel wanted to curry favour with the company for political reason. However, this seems to have back fired, as the war veterans were then accused by the communities of being sell outs.

As can be deciphered from War Veteran 4 in box 3.1, there seems to be conflicts of war veterans and the general population. There is no question that the company provided more land and support to war veterans than the ordinary people. They could afford this because the war veterans were fewer, could be the source of conflicts and negative mobilisation that would disrupt the project and by policy on land, all allocations need to meet 20% quota in terms of the number of plots or the size of land, which ever applies. Therefore, the company was within the policy parameters to provide such concessions. However, the communities seem to then accuse the war veterans of selling out and being the spokespersons of the company given the benefits preferred on them.

Box 3.1: Story of War Veteran 4

I shall speak on behalf of the war veterans and not focus on the community at large. As war veterans we went to war mainly to claim back our land. We did not want to be located on unfertile rocky territories. So as each person went to war, we had the mindset of coming back home to be located on fertile land. Historically we were told that in Chisumbanje we would be located in the far unfertile territories and we objected to this under the notion that we had fought for the land. This relocation we believed was being caused by the Smith regime so after the war no one was relocated to the unfertile territories of Masvingo and we remained on our land. ARDA had its own territory and we were clearly aware of these boundaries. As war veterans come the era of land invasion, we decided not to go to Masvingo or any other area but we wanted to concentrate of attaining our benefits from our local area. We invaded ARDA state land and said we wanted the government to give us land portions in that territory. Letters were written and sent to the MLRR and it was agreed to have land apportioned at DRC, located further up from ARDA. People got between 3-5 hectares.

War Veteran 4 indicated that they were content but we were then told that we shall consider you as candidates for state land that shall be distributed later. So when the company then came we were already benefiting and we were told not to cultivate in that area and as war veterans we complied to this request as we were told that we would be given a place to cultivate together with our community. We agreed to this as this was a project that was said would benefit the locals and nation at large. A lot of promises were made inclusive of dam construction, hospital construction, irrigation set up, and that we would be part of the out grower scheme. We gladly welcomed this and although they ploughed down our crops they said that they would compensate us. Some people had about 5 hectares of land with cotton being destroyed; maize was put in a scotch cart and sold. With that having been done and over time we assessed as war veterans the progress of the company in terms of helping us. We decided to demonstrate and we called upon the community and their response was that you as war veterans were the ones whose land was taken and as a result you need to go and stand for yourselves and we do the same. Little did they know that the company started getting land from us the war veterans and were going to spill-over to the rest of the community.

The community was reluctant to listen to us and we then proceeded to go and demonstrate by ourselves as war veterans. I thought it was clear that I highlight the history of the land distribution that ended up happening as the rest of the local community could say to you that war veterans are the ones that benefited the most from this investment. The community did not agree to assist us and we started to make arrangements as a team of about 500 war veterans all the way from Chipinge South and other wards not only Chisumbanje. We set down with the company and we referred them to the initial promise they made to us that they would consider to give us state land. They offered to make us out growers and they took a group of 125 war veterans first. Each was given 2 hectares of planted sugarcane. From this benefit, it is necessary to assess the benefits of these 2hectares given to the people. This is a challenge. All we were told was we have 2 hectares not that we know specifically where these 2 hectares are or what it takes to cultivate this land.

Source: Focused Group Discussion, Chisumbanje on 14 May 2014

A War Veteran Representative said that the Chisumbanje ethanol investment is tantamount to colonization, and villagers suggested a halt to their operations until they consulted displaced communities[21]. In spite of having been accused of wanting to close down the company project through their actions, war veterans holding protection-for-community-benefits frames are typically careful to point out that they are not “against the project”.

4.5 Women’s land rights in the context of “displacement”

The investment affected women and men differently, which necessitates taking gender as a mediating factor in the Chisumbanje ethanol project. However, by gender profiling, there is a miss of the actual effects of the project on women (Behrman, et al., 2011.), given the skewed rights that in African set up places men far ahead of resources ownership and access as compared to women. This is not new, and Paradza (2010) by examining the communal areas challenged the received wisdom that women are always disadvantaged, because there is an overt mi-interpretation and misrepresentation of African family structures and the division of labour, and how resources are shared in the family set up. In fact, in any family hardly is the fact of who owns what really matters when it comes to looking after families. These matters only arise when the family is dissolved due to divorce or death of a male spouse, which sets it cultural methods of handling property, which in any case has transformed in the last few decades. The heir to property is the son, but is given responsibility for the whole family left behind, hence the concept of ownership become trite. Nonetheless, in families where there are girl children, interference from other family members seem to be a key issue, though it may not be as widespread as in the past.

A dominant thesis around gender in Africa is that on any land deal, poor rural women loose out because they do not have reliable access to land, secure land tenure, or customary land rights (Gaidzanwa, 1985, 1995). Yet, Matondi, (2012) also found that where the state has done a “land deal” in the form of the FTLRP, women have largely lost out not just land, but a second best when it comes to the resources to use the land. Investments in mega-projects on customary lands, shifts household dynamics in terms of their roles, income-generation activities, and property rights. However, a surprising finding was that women in Chisumbanje were not lobbying for access to irrigation plots or lost land as to be “their” personal property, but rather for their spouses who had been pushed out or incorporated in small sized land of 0.5 hectares and very far from their places of residency. Green Fuel land, has therefore not contributed to shifts on gender property rights, but has affected the rights of family property, which brings together families to lobby against the company. This material point has been missed in most of the gender type of analysis in most of the studies to date, of which below I present evidence of what women were contesting.

The major change in land and resources tenure positively affected women greatly, as family units broken in the past by lack of economic opportunities were being reconstructed. Prior to the land investments, the poor rural women of Chisumbanje and Chinyamukwakwa often had reliable access to land, secure land tenure, or customary land rights, and could do what they like with minimal support from spouses. As witnessed by the Zimbabwe independent (2013) during a tour they “….came across George Chinyamukwakwa (42), his wife Elizabeth Makuyana (28), their two sons Lovemore and Robert, harvesting their maize crop. They were working together in their field, an increasingly rare phenomenon in a Zimbabwe whose high unemployment levels have driven many across the borders in search of the proverbial greener pastures while tearing families apart”[22]. However, not every woman has been pleased with the project. While they acknowledge that some work was done in the community (e.g. bridge construction), women pointed out that it was not intentional development for the community. They indicated that it was way to get water to the other side of the bridge, and communities benefitted by accident.

Women reported to be living in Chisumbanje and their farms are in the area taken by company. Their own version is that some of the people lost land ranging from 3-10 ha, while in allocations they did not get irrigable land. Yet, historically some were farming on the plots since 1983 and in 1998, yet others had only started with new families in 2006. Women in FGDs, also pointed out that the loss of land affected everyone, as the children of traditional leaders lost their land, yet other were accommodated in the war veterans section. The distance (30 kilometres away) to the new plots and size of the land were raised is contested matters. Yet, the authorities promised that the land was for temporary use, without any specifics or anything written down. Everyone who got and in the irrigation, got 0.5 hectares, everyone, and the biggest problem are it’s more than 30km away. You travel for the better part of the day, it’s too far away. They said they men would be given sugarcane farms and this 0.5 hectares was meant for the women. The dams at the irrigation do not have water, plus they are located at the margin of the sugarcane plantation. Biggest problem is a small part of the community got the 0.5, so other members of the community have no incentive to take care of their animals. The villages that were affected are Masunde, Bepe, Masunde, Madwayi, Zuwarekipi, and Vhutuza. The company made us the security fence for their sugarcane, they used as buffer. Out of 1060, only 172 got plots, so those with cattle and they did not get acres, will simply let their animals free.

4.6 Conflicts and resolution of compensation

In Chisumbanje the issue of compensation is double faced: first compensation for lost lands is contested; second compensation for lost produce as the Company admitted to having ploughed crops belong to the community. Communities have raised issues of their crops having been destroyed by the company. It is not clear, why this destruction took place, and whether there was agreement between the company and the communities for the destruction to happen. It is also not clear, if all the destroyed crops were compensated for or not, and how the company and the community planned for food security parameters. The company seem to have acknowledged and admitted its culpability in the destruction of the crops as they gave the following statements:

The company through their Human Resources Manager Mr.Zuze agreed that they  are responsible for the destruction of crops belonging to the residents  since 2008,” we are consulting with Agritex to establish the value of the  destroyed crops so that we start compensation” Zuze admitted. This statement  was made at a meeting at Chisumbanje on the 18th of August. More than one  thousand villagers including Chief Garahwa, Headman  Chisumbanje,Chinyamukwakwa and Matikwa attended[23]. 

However, an important point to observe is that the company was not strategic in its handling of the crop that was on the land targeted for production as directed by ARDA. Instead of taking a hard-line stance, it would have been proper to negotiate directly with the communities, allow them to harvest and then carried out awareness programmes on the precise areas where the company was planning to plant the following season,. This would not have encouraged the politicisation of the issue, and could have fostered better relations between the company and the community. The GNU in 2012, waded into the issue and provided recommendations:

The Company should immediately compensate and resettle the 117 households that had offer letters and were displaced from ARDA estates. With Government and ARDA supervision, the Company should engage the farmers directly and pay the compensation in lieu of the land user rights that were lost, and negotiate terms for the farmers to continue to live on the estates as out-growers and producers to the Ethanol Project. Of the 117 farmers who held sub-leases in ARDA estates, 116 have stayed on as out-growers of sugarcane to the Project. Their major grievances have been non-payment of compensation for land user rights and slow payment for cane delivered to the project in the 2010/2011 season. Of the total, US$196,800 due to the farmers for that season, US$161,800.00 had been paid and US $35,000 was outstanding and was only paid on 14th September, 2012. All payments to these farmers are effected through ARDA. With Government and ARDA supervision, the Company should go into direct arrangements for payment of these farmers, and should avoid delays in paying for crop deliveries (Mutamba Press Statement, 2012).

It seems that prior planning was not participatory, as communities should have been aware that certain parts of the land they were using were targeted for sugarcane production. Such targeting needed to be specific on the timing and announcing when the land would be needed by the company so that communities will not commit resources (finance, seeds, fertilisers, chemicals, tillage and labour) only to see this ploughed by the company. Acknowledgement on its own is not enough, because compensation needed to be paid as affirmed by the Mutambara (2012) mission. However, there seems to be no follow up discussion of how this lost land (used for securing food security) mean for the future food requirements of the community.

4.7 Conflicts over production relations post land transfer

The ARDA Chisumbanje Settler Scheme Farmers (116) signed an MoU with Macdom Investments (Private) Limited, where Macdom developed the out grower’s land and established a sugar cane crop thereon and has been maintaining the crop together with the land and its appurtenant works. The out growers have agreed to re-imburse Macdom for all the capital expenditure incurred in the development of the land and sugar cane crop as well as all maintenance and operation costs associated.[24] The total amount the outgrowers in Chisumbanje owe to Macdom in development and maintenance fees is USD2.4 million, which the outgrowers will pay through a stop order for a period of three years. However after the three seasonal years the outgrowers will chose either to sell to Macdom of any other company that buys sugar cane. Under the agreement, Macdom is obligated to supply water for irrigation purposes as well as other seasonal inputs as agreed by the parties from time to time necessary for the production of mercantile quality sugar cane on the out grower’s plot.

According to Raphael Zuze, there are 116 outgrowers under 410ha of land and 125 war veterans under 250ha of land in Chisumbanje.[25] However the model is a unique model in that the farmers are not much involved in the production but they are just land owners and the company does everything for them and pays them at the end of every harvest. This is because the farmers do not have expertise in the production of the expected quality of the sugar cane required for the production of ethanol. However, there are inconsistencies when it comes to out grower schemes, in an interview one out grower lamented,

“When they cut the sugar cane we asked the position about our fields and we sought audience with the investor, but the investor said ARDA did not tell me that there are settler farmers within the land, but promised to give us back our land and the sugar cane after the first ratoon. When he harvested the first harvest we then asked about the position of our fields but nothing concrete came out of it. As we speak, the company owes us more than $300 000 for three seasons which were not paid. When we ask he said, he is not selling the ethanol so he cannot pay. Now that he is selling again he is not paying”[26]

The company buys sugar cane from the farmers at US$4/ton and the expected yield per hectare is 135tonnes. In Middle Sabi, there is a plan to develop 6000ha in Middle Sabi for the out grower scheme under the A2 model.[27] Though there was an agreement over the $4.00/ton selling price there has been issues as the out growers are now comparing with Triangle and Hippo Valley outgrowers that are being paid $7/ton, a difference of $6/ton and the farmers are not yet paid the $4/ton since 2010.[28] Under the MoU, Macdom admits that it still owes the farmers USD178, 000.00.[29]

4.8 Does the Chisumbanje ethanol project fit a land grab?

A thorough analysis of the global trends in land investment and Zimbabwe’s own investment policy shows that it would seem that the Chisumbanje ethanol project does not fit the land grab discourse of the international dimension mentioned above for a variety of reasons. Though, issues of land displacement have been raised and lack of community beneficiation is key, it seem from the interviews of various stakeholders, including local communities are not in agreement. First the Green Fuel Company points out that it is leasing land from ARDA, and has no say on any land related matter, and only waits for instructions from ARDA on where to plant sugarcane. Government therefore has the strongest say on land ownership, of which then issues that arises on land related matters should be addressed by government and not the company.

Second, government is a shareholder in the project with the same rights as Green Fuels Company, which is the reason why ARDA is central in the project. ARDA claims that it has more land in the area that it has not been using for generation and had ceded the land on a temporary basis for the use by communities. This on its own does not take away the ownership rights of the land and the communities are said to have been aware of this arrangements for generations. However, a problem then arises that for generations, communities have established themselves on state land, and their removal would seem to be too harsh, which is the reason why delicate and sensitive negotiations have to take place.

Third, it is critical to engage traditional chiefs, yet in the case of Chisumbanje there has been contradictory statements from the traditional leadership. Therefore building their capacity to conversation is key, which the international guidelines could be helpful. It would seem, that Chief Garahwa was more concerned with the promises made that the land issue. In an interview noted that when Green Fuel came in, they made promises to him as a chief and to the community as a whole, which they are now not fulfilling and the investment is no longer benefiting the community as promised when the company came in. According to Chief Garahwa problems aroused when ARDA invaded peoples land, when it was common knowledge that ARDA had its own land which was fenced and everyone knew the boundaries. During the process of the invasion of people’s land, the company destroyed crops which were ready for harvesting. Though these crops were compensated, it was not to the delight of the local people. Headman Chisumbanje presiding over 16 villages with 10 of the 16 affected by the land displacement carried out by Macdom Investments, pointed out that people used to grow maize for food and cotton as a cash crop and we were able to build our houses using proceeds from cotton. During better seasons we would sell excess grain to the GMB. Now that most families have lost their land we can no longer grow food and cotton for sale, even our cattle do not have anywhere to graze.

However, the Chief and the Headman admitted that they were consulted on behalf of the community and that is why he carried a traditional ceremony to bless the investment and has been taking all the problems that have risen to the District Administrator. While the truism, in this intervention showed that indeed there where contested land issues, and that communities had been displaced and compensation was required, it remains to us trite to regard the displacement in the same mould as what is happening elsewhere. While displacement is displacement, some would argue, the context needs to be put in its right perspective. First it is the manner in which such displacement takes place that requires interrogation, in this case the state is blameworthy because it was in charge of directing where Green Fuel could go. It therefore remain erroneous and disingenuous to blame the company that has no land literally to say. Second, it also has to be put in context that the company has not refused land compensation, and has cited several constraining in the overall project performance, which government had responsibility for.

For instance, by agreeing to a massive potentially displacing project, without dealing with the high market end of the ethanol value chain meant that the company was squeezed between the politics of Zimbabwe, could not produce and generate resources for the compensation of the communities that the same government was insisting on. Thirdly, it would seem that the former Deputy Prime Minister by going hard on the company, seemed to have lost the fact that in fact ARDA (and government parastatals under his government) had approved all the plans and was in the forefront of land “giveaway”. It boggles the mind, why the Deputy Prime Minister did not engage the parastatals responsible for land and with significant shares, based on the land resource. This context needs to be taken seriously beyond the international agreements (voluntary or otherwise) to address the needs of the communities. Yet, such solutions needs to be provided in a context of non-confrontation and politicisation of a potential national project with economic benefits as seen through the related investments that have come courtesy of the ethanol production by Green Fuel that the communities are not disputing.

4.9 Ethanol blending: the noise and confusion

The project is alleged to be run by a figure close to ZANU PF and by the governmental Agriculture and Rural Development Authority (Arda), it is, as everything else in the country, a subject of a heavy politicized agenda. Among arguments made in the debate were the company’s failure to comply with the government’s indigenization program which requires a majority of national ownership, a discussion about the potential negative impact of the gasoline/ethanol mixture on car engines to fuel prices, the Green Fuel’s monopoly on ethanol (being the country’s sole ethanol producer) along with the introduction of national legislation mandating the gasoline/ethanol mixture, which not only underlines policies to save on oil imports but also the amount of revenues the company would see when such legislation was mandated.

In August 2013, the Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority (ZERA) introduced an E5 blending, that is 95 percent gasoline and 5 percent ethanol, which in October 2013, and it increased to E10. For a project that experienced very recent and enormous difficulties, the current situation is a complete change of direction in the country’s energy policy. The company’s future plans include the establishing of four more ethanol plants to be supplied by 46,000 hectares of sugarcane (from the current 10,000 h), with a combined annual capacity of 1.5 billion litres of ethanol. The most common argument from the public is that ethanol burns faster and therefore reduces the coverage of kilometers per litre. They also argued that there is need to bring back unleaded so that there is a choice where if one needs unleaded then one buys and if one needs blend the do so. One motorist in Greencroft alleged that blend was damaging his car, a Mercedes Benz inscribed strictly unleaded. So many motorists are not aware of the fuel they are using especially female motorists with most of them not knowing that this country has a mandatory blending policy.[30] According to Mutambara (2012) “Some of the consumers’ negative attitudes to ethanol are based on sheer ignorance and fear of the unknown. In fact, from a review of the history of fuel blending before independence up to 1992, there is no evidence of vehicle damage due to the use of ethanol blends. Furthermore ethanol technology and quality has improved since then, and so has car technology towards compatibility with ethanol blends”. The benefits of ethanol blends and the associated personal, community, national and environmental advantages must be clearly articulated in a massive branding and marketing campaign.

4.10 Disputed economic empowerment issues in the sugar sector

A hotly contested issue in Chisumbanje where the Macdom has got 90% ownership while the government through ARDA retains the remaining 10% The community on the other hand is crying foul over the 10% community share ownership scheme. However negotiations among the concerned parties have already opened, although differences in approach on the shareholding determinants have emerged at the centre of the negotiations. However, according to Robson Nyakurwa[31] the machine together with its installation and the total investment cannot cost US$600 million (the initial amount of the investment that was being cited in the press) as purported by the company, comparing the machine to the one which was set up by Zimplats at its platinum mine. The machine is a second hand machine that was designed by M. Dedin and was once assembled and used in Brazil at an ethanol plant along the Mississippi River.

4.11 Environmental contestation

There are contestations over water pollution with the community pointing out that the company did not carry out an environment assessment and that they are spilling venice into Jerawachera river, affecting aquatic creatures and livestock actually dying because of this. The company refutes such claims arguing that it has carried out an environmental assessment exercise. However observations by the research team reveal that the water in Jerawachera is actually dirty and aquatic creatures are actually dying from the affluent spilled into the river.

Proper ground mapping of deforestation based on time series will need to be done in future, to compare the situation before and after. At the same time, it will be critical to carry out an assessment of the forest resources that the communities have lost, because these were used for a variety of multi-purposes, commercial, nutrition and also cultural. The company has embarked on a re-forestation exercise where they document every tree that was destroyed during land clearing and for every one tree destroyed, they replace with two trees planted.

5. FROM PERCEPTIONS OF EXPLOITATION TO ECONOMIC HAPPINESS IN CHISUMBANJE

5.1 Core business of Green Fuel

There are 6000ha of land under sugar cane in Chisumbanje Estate (Macdom Investments) where there are 116 outgrowers under 410ha of land and 125 war veterans under 250ha of land.[32]The company then buys sugar cane from the farmers at US $4/tone and the expected yield per hectare is 135tonnes. In Middle Sabi, the company is utilizing 3500ha of original ARDA land with no displacement of the community, and there is a plan to develop 6000ha in Middle Sabi for the out grower scheme under the A2 model.[33] The ethanol plant produces 300 000 to 350 000 litres of ethanol every day, depending on the supply of cane, which is a significant proportion to Zimbabwe’s daily consumption of 1.2 million litres of petrol.[34] According to the Zimbabwe Energy Council, ‘Zimbabwe imports 30 to 40 million litres of petrol every month and this decision by government to invest in ethanol will save the country between 1, 5 million and 2, 5 million litres which will translate into $2 million dollars every month. This is a great saving for a country that is hit by a high import bill.’ [35] The investment in ethanol production and the mandatory blending has reduced the price of fuel from $1.50 a litre to as low as 85 cents if it is E100, or $1.47 if it is E10. The ethanol project has got a potential of opening the possibility of a motor manufacturing plant using Brazilian technology.[36]

The project can be a sustainable home grown solution towards energy security and the nation could make significant savings on its national import bill. The first three months of ethanol blending saw Zimbabwe fuel import bill cut by nearly US$20 million. (Herald, 1 Jan 2014). According to the Energy Minister, the project is saving the country US$9 million per month in fuel imports (Herald, 17 January 2014). Currently the plant is producing 30 000-35 000 litres of fuel per day depending on the supply of cane and is producing 15 mega watts of electricity with 3 mega watts used to light up the plant and 12 mega watts being pumped in the national grid. Green fuel is the first company to invest in a processing plant in Chipinge South, there were no other companies based there except for cotton companies (buying depots). Green fuel was the first industry to come into the constituency to do farming and processing of sugar cane into ethanol. According to the local MP for Chipinge South, the investment feed into almost every cluster of ZIM ASSET (Zimbabwe’s new economic blue print 2013-2018), particularly the beneficiation (they grow sugar cane and value add by turning it into fuel (ethanol). There is value addition. There are also other by-products like electricity generation. The electricity is already being generated. The plant is a typical case of ZIM ASSET agenda.

5.2 Technology and multiplier effects

The production at Chisumbanje is highly technological with nearly everything done by machinery. The company uses large Magnum tractors for land clearing and GPS leveling. For planting they use what they call laser guided planting and when the cane is still young they use machines for fertilizer application, however they use flood irrigation for irrigation in Chisumbanje while they use overhead irrigation in Middle Sabi. All the cane at Green Fuels is harvested by a Magnum Harvester and there is no manual harvesting. The spill-over from Chisumbanje ethanol project should in theory bring technology transfers, upgrading of domestic production, quality improvements, employment creation, backward and forward linkages and multiplier effects through local sourcing of labour and other inputs and processing of outputs, and possibly increased food supplies for the domestic market and for export. However, these benefits will not flow if investments create enclaves of advanced agriculture in a dualistic system involving traditional smallholder agriculture where smallholders cannot emulate the techniques and methods of large-scale agriculture. One could go even further, since such investments may also undermine or alienate smallholders through conflicts over land rights (Matondi et al. 2011; Cotula 2013:2). The ethanol plant turbine generator produces 15 megawatts of electricity with 3 megawatts used at the plant to power the mill and the compounds and the remainder is pumped into the national grid through a 33kv power line that connects to the Mkwasine Sub-grid[37]. The company is producing a lot of carbon dioxide which is currently not being captured and it can capture the carbon dioxide produced and use it to produce carbonated drinks or export and currently there are interests from Delta Beverages as well as Boc Gasses.[38]

Another aspect of technical change in agriculture that needs to be watched is the mechanization of sugarcane production, which can lead to labour redundancy and increased exploitation of the labour remaining in the sector. The possibilities of intensifying sugarcane production can intensify their efforts to increase their productivity at the expense of other crops, and in general world wide it is women who tend to suffer from loss of access to subsistence land, loss of incomes, and unhappiness and rise in suicides as studies show in the case of the cotton boom in Gokwe in the 1980s.

5.3 Social transformation in Chisumbanje: for the better and for the worse

The survey we carried out in Chisumbanje showed that all the respondents who were not directly affected by the ethanol plant (did not lose their land), i.e. business owners, informal traders, bricklayers, carpenters and welders felt that the project brought increased opportunities for local development as evidenced by more banks, the emergency of small businesses (small grocery outlets, furniture and hardware shops, fuel stations and hair saloons), increased downstream job opportunities, housing construction and general improvement in the standard of living (less frequent power cuts, more reliable mobile networks and transport), (Thondhlana 2014). According to Headman Chisumbanje, it cannot be disputed that the plant despite creating problems for the people has brought about some sort of development to the community. Prior to the plant there was only POSB and Agri-bank in terms of banks but now there is BANCABC, CABS, CBZ and ZB. Though we had shops that sold all wares including hardware prior to the investment, these shops have increased[39].

The investment has boosted social investments in education, health and technology in the community with the company through its community social responsibility programme having built a community library that will host internet services for the community and a community sewing workshop where ten members of the community have stated producing work suits for sale to the company at Takwirira.[40] The ethanol plant is tipped to become the backbone of the provincial economy through infrastructural development, power generation, food security and employment creation. (The Financial Gazette, 5 Dec 2013)The project has received overwhelming endorsement from politicians, the business community, traditional leaders and villagers as the new source of provincial and national development. However, the economic vibrancy has brought about social ills such as, increase in corruption, increase in violence and crime, lack of work security, labor absenteeism, firings, unemployment, loss of livelihood, loss of traditional knowledge/practices/cultures, militarization and increased police presence, Social problems (alcoholism, prostitution, etc.). According to interviews carried out, the community is failing to send their children to school because they do not have the land to till and have no jobs hence an increase in prostitution as a means for survival.

5.4 Dynamics of (mis) understood transformation: from cash crop to cash crop

According to interviews with the community, the investment has done more harm than good to the community. The community relied on farming as its key livelihood activity, with farmers growing cash crops and food crops way before Green Fuel came into the area. The community used to grow cotton as a cash crop and cotton companies used to have depots at the local business centers where they provided farmers with inputs and buy the cotton from them. This has seen a boom in the local economy with people being able to build better houses for themselves as well as a boom at Checheche growth point where shops that include banks, hardware, grocery shops, car sales and many other services established. Many parents were able to send their children to school through cotton production and produced food crops with excess grain being sold to the Grain Marketing Board. At the initial stage the company had employed a lot of locals with figures of those employed by the company rising up to 1000. Greater problems came in 2011 when the company closed due to the low uptake of ethanol in the country and the politics that were characteristic of the GNU era, many locals were retrenched and when the mill re-opened they were either replaced by whites or blacks from other regions.[41] Chief Garahwa expected the investment to benefit the community to a greater extend since it took land away from the community changing the livelihood patterns of the local people. However these seem not to be happening as the company is no-longer fulfilling its promises.[42] A key informant interviewed had the following to say:

“The so called investment has done more harm than good to the community. The community relied on farming as its key livelihood activity, with farmers growing cash crops and food crops way before Green Fuel came into the area. The community used to grow cotton as a cash crop and cotton companies used to have depots at the local business centres where they provided farmers with inputs and buy the cotton from them. This has seen a boom in the local economy with people being able to build better houses for themselves as well as a boom at Checheche growth point where shops that include banks, hardware, grocery shops, car sales and many other services established. Many parents were able to send their children to school through cotton production and produced food crops with excess grain being sold to the Grain Marketing Board. The coming of Green Fuel saw one thousand and eight (1008) farmers losing their land that ranged from 2ha-40ha to the company and out of the 1008 from Chisumbanje; only 172 farmers were compensated with 0.5ha irrigation schemes per family. The company had slashed down crops that belonged to the farmers during land clearance and takeover and only compensated the farmers with US$3.00/ha. Now the community is failing to send their children to school because they do not have the land to till and have no jobs. The few who have been employed are not being paid up; employees at Green fuel have gone for more than three months without pay despite the company now selling the ethanol produced.”[43]

According to Chief Garahwa, though the company brought about irrigation schemes as compensation to those that lost their land several problems bedevil the whole issue.

According to Raphael Zuze, there are 116 outgrowers under 410ha of land and 125 war veterans under 250ha of land in Chisumbanje.[45] However the model is a unique model in that the farmers are not much involved in the production but they are just land owners and the company does everything for them and pays them at the end of every harvest. This is because the farmers do not have expertise in the production of the expected quality of the sugar cane required for the production of ethanol. However plans are at an advanced stage to involve Chinhoyi University of Science and Technology to train the outgrowers so that they grow sugar cane for ethanol production on their own. The company buys sugar cane from the farmers at US$4/tone and the expected yield per hectare is 135tonnes. In Middle Sabi, there is a plan to develop 6000ha in Middle Sabi for the out grower scheme under the A2 model.[46] However, there are inconsistencies when it comes to out grower schemes, in an interview one out grower lamented,

The ARDA Chisumbanje Settler Scheme Farmers (116) signed an MoU with Macdom Investments (Private) Limited, where Macdom developed the out grower’s land and established a sugar cane crop thereon and has been maintaining the crop together with the land and its appurtenant works. The out growers have agreed to re-imburse Macdom for all the capital expenditure incurred in the development of the land and sugar cane crop as well as all maintenance and operation costs associated.[48] The total amount the outgrowers in Chisumbanje owe to Macdom in development and maintenance fees is USD2, 400, 000, which the outgrowers will pay through a stop order for a period of three years. However after the three seasonal years the outgrowers will chose either to sell to Macdom of any other company that buys sugar cane. Under the agreement, Macdom is obligated to supply water for irrigation purposes as well as other seasonal inputs as agreed by the parties from time to time necessary for the production of mercantile quality sugar cane on the out grower’s plot. Though there was an agreement over the $4.00/t selling price there has been issues as the out growers are now comparing with Triangle and Hippo Valley outgrowers that are being paid $70/ tone, a difference of $66/tone and the farmers are not yet paid the $4/ton since 2010.[49] Under the MoU, Macdom admits that it still owes the farmers USD178, 000.00.[50]

5.5 Employment issues in the sugar investments

There are 4500 workers working on the agricultural departments of the company both in Chisumbanje and Middle Sabi and 300 people working on the mill who all work on two eight hour shifts per day.[51] According to Ropafadzo, the according of town status to Checheche Growth Point and the subsequent growth in infrastructure and a surge in services can be attributed to the existence of Green Fuel.[52] The company has got a monthly wage bill of US$1,5million and this only has changed Checheche Growth Point which has now seen it having more banks than the town of Chinhoyi.[53] According to the local Member of Parliament, Enock Porusingazi, Green fuel is the first company to invest in a processing plant in Chipinge South. There were no other companies based there except for cotton companies (buying depots). Green fuel was the first industry to come into the constituency to do farming and processing of sugar cane into ethanol. It is the only company that employs most people, and currently has 4500 workers that are drawn from all over the country. According to the MP, Green fuel is most welcome as the company is committed; however, between the years 2010 and 2013, there were problems resulted in Green Fuel not operating. A lot of conflict within government, especially the key Ministry of Energy and Power Development, resulted in Green Fuel not being given a license (to facilitate mandatory blending). Therefore, operations had to be halted resulting in a lot of people being retrenched.

The company has got a monthly wage bill of US$1,5million and this only has changed Checheche Growth Point. The company has employed 4500 workers so far in its agriculture and the processing plant, with 70-75% of the workforce drawn from the locals. 300 people out of the 4500 work on the mill and there are differences in terms of payments as the payments are based on the sector, with the minimum wage for the agricultural sector ranging from $80-100 while that of the mill is pegged at $1800. However due to political reasons local resisted taking up jobs at the plant but now they are complaining that the company do not employ locals.

According to the local community, at the initial stage the company had employed a lot of locals with figures of those employed by the company ranging up to 1000. Greater problems came in 2011 when the company closed due to the low uptake of ethanol in the country and the politics that were characteristic of the GNU era. The locals were retrenched and told to pray for the country to pass a law that push for mandatory blending, night vigils and fasting were held at the plant so that the plant reopens. When the Ministry of Energy and Power Development enforced the 10% mandatory blending there was the restoration of hope on the community not knowing that it was not going to be the same. The locals who have been retrenched were replaced by either whites or blacks from other regions. The few locals employed by the company are doing menial jobs and very few are in management. Allegations of only whites being promoted have been raised, the company started with two whites in management in 2009 and now the number has risen to more than ten.

The community complains that recruitments are done in Harare at the company’s headquarters and this has shut out on the locals. According to one local person interviewed, the locals are said not to be educated, which is not true, Chipinge has got so many educated and trained people who should be employed by the company). The company recruits more people from other regions even as laborers. “Do the job of weeding, irrigating require the company to recruit someone from Gutu -a place outside Chipinge?” The local MP is of the view that locals should constitute the majority of those employed by Green Fuel. In an interview, he admitted that there used to be more blacks in management; however, the number of white managers has increased:

“There were very few whites when the project started but the number has gone up (from 2 to around 20 in the agric department, former white farmers). However, the human resources practitioner ought to be a black person because the majority is blacks. The majority shareholder is a white and in any business one may want to have a person who he/she trusts. The white managers are former farmers, local Zimbabwean farmers, some of whom lost their farms. The farmers are indigenous whites, one Jeremy Dyke was farming in Rusape, one was in Mutare, and one was in Beitbridge. Since they came to work they should concentrate on working, leave politics, and racial discrimination. So far there is no problem.”

Given the high rates of unemployment in Zimbabwe, we also examined the types of jobs on offer in terms of the opportunities and lack of in the economic investments. During construction in 2009 the company recruited more than 1000 locals mainly as assistants to the technical people, and most of them were trained on the job as artisans, boiler makers and many others jobs. At the initial stage the company had employed a lot of locals with figures of those employed by the company ranging up to 1000. Greater problems came in 2011 when the company closed due to the low uptake of ethanol in the country and the politics that were characteristic of the GNU era. The locals were retrenched and told to pray for the country to pass a law that push for mandatory blending. Night vigils and fasting were held at the plant so that the plant reopens. When the Ministry of Energy and Power Development enforced the 10% mandatory blending there was the restoration of hope on the community not knowing that it was not going to be the same. The locals who have been retrenched were replaced by either whites or blacks from other regions. The few locals employed by the company are doing menial jobs and very few are in management.

Only whites people were said to be promoted, the company started with two whites in management in 2009 and now the number has risen to ten. Recruitments are done in Harare at the company’s headquarters and this has shut out on the locals. Decisions made on labor do not get input from the locals as was promises when the company first opened. Corruption and nepotism are the order of the day and locals have to pay clandestinely to the recruiting officer for them to get a job. Some pay in the form of goats or forfeiting ones pay for a month or so depending on the type of job one is looking for. Recruitments are now done in Harare at the company’s headquarters thereby disadvantaging the locals who lost their land. To those local who lost their jobs, they are being replaced by former white farmers and you wonder whether it is a solace to the white farmers who lost their land during the FTLR. (Field notes)

According to a member of the workers committee who remained anonymous[54], safety measures for the worker are not adequately followed; the boiler is not under roof posing a danger to the workers who do not have adequate safety wear with the last issuance of uniforms and safety shoes being 2009. What baffles the worker is that there is a sure market of the product but no improvements on the working conditions. Workers were last paid three months ago. There are allegations that there is no legal code of conduct for the workers and workers are being forced to join the Zimbabwe Sugarcane Workers Union though they belong to the energy sector and should join the Zimbabwe Energy Workers Union.

5.6 Broader national socio-economic benefits on the sugar value chain

The Chisumbanje Ethanol Project is going to change the way we look at fuel consumption in Zimbabwe, especially with the introduction of mandatory blending. The question many would want to know is the impact of mandatory fuel blending on our economy. Fuel is currently our biggest import, amounting to about US$2 billion per annum. The Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority (ZERA) said the current mandatory blending at E10 will see the country saving US$4 million per month. Government plans to reach a mandatory blending of E20, which implies even more savings. Other countries like Brazil are already on a mandatory blending of E24. The main benefit of fuel blending is that it reduces dependence on foreign oil and increases the nation’s energy independence. High dependence on foreign petroleum supplies puts Zimbabwe at risks of trade deficits, supply disruptions and price changes. That would reduce dependency on foreign fuel imports and vaccinate the nation against unstable price rises. Oil prices rose by 150 percent over the past decade, from US$40 per barrel in 2003 to more than US$100 per barrel. Blending can therefore make us less vulnerable to these external shocks.

Ethanol is good for the environment as it produces lower carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide emissions and it also improves fuel octane. E10 reduces greenhouse gas emissions by 12 to 19 percent. Ethanol production would cover domestic consumption, and the balance will be exported to regional markets. Such project includes the construction of the Kondo Dam that would be the biggest inland dam in Manicaland. Therefore the mandatory blending of E10 is that it has seen Chisumbanje Ethanol Project being able to generate electricity from baggasse (a cane by-product) amounting to 15 megawatts -- sufficient to power about 30,000 households, with 3 megawatts used to light up the plant and the reminder pumped into the national grid through the Mkwasine sub grid. When the project reaches its peak, it would generate 50 megawatts of electricity, capable of powering about 90,000 households. This would help reduce the energy deficit woes the country currently faces.

Further, the project is employing 4 500 people in the agriculture and mill sector and is expected to create about 10,000 jobs – making ethanol production one of the single largest job creation ventures in recent years. The Chisumbanje community is set to benefit, as 10 percent of the project’s land, or 4,000 hectares, is being allocated to individual farmers to try out cane farming. A number of downstream industries -- including fertilizer manufacture, the cosmetics industry, explosives and beverage makers are also likely to benefit from the venture as the plant produces a lot of carbon dioxide which can be harvested. Checheche has been issued with town status and in a way it can be accrued to the coming in of Green Fuels which has created a business boom at Checheche. Due to a lot of people being employed, there has been a shortage of accommodation at Checheche and there is a company that servicing stands for residential purpose.

6. CONCLUSION

The Chisumbanje ethanol development project is a strategic investment at the national level. Ethanol development in Chisumbanje is premised upon the development of “marginal” and “unproductive” land to generate benefits such as energy security and independence, efficient irrigation schemes, smallholder out-grower schemes, job creation, electric power generation and the stimulation of downstream industries. Most local people, particularly displaced farmers, felt they had been left worse off than they would be without the bio-fuel investment. There is a clear collision between national interests and local communities in Chisumbanje. The state envision bio-fuel development as a pathway to development — an economic opportunity to energy independence, while the locals see it as a threat to their livelihoods. Rather than being merely “marginal” or “unproductive,” the land appropriated for ethanol development was crucial for land based livelihood activities such as food- and cash-crop farming, livestock production and direct natural resource use among other income sources (Thondhlana 2014). Some of these income sources were reported to be increasingly insecure due to recurrent droughts, for example, maize crop farming. However, other drought-resistant crops such as sorghum, and activities such as cotton farming and livestock production represented a buffer against fluctuations in other income sources. (Benjaminsen et al. 2006; Hall 2011; Nalepa and Bauer 2012) stipulate that lands perceived as marginal by the state and large private investors do, in most cases, provide a vital basis for the livelihoods of poorer and vulnerable groups. Thus, the ethanol policy processes and direction should be informed and guided by the realization that dry land communal farming system in Chisumbanje has multiple production objectives, which are part of local ways of adapting to income stresses.

Political and private interests may underlie the seemingly noble shift towards ethanol production, which breeds winners and losers in emerging ethanol development projects (Shattuck 2009). The Government of Zimbabwe may have been especially keen to satisfy the needs of ethanol investors, because they are the few private investors that were prepared to sidestep international concerns about the country’s political problems. Thus, from a policy perspective, it is also important to understand the political configurations that shape pro-ethanol production arguments. Further, the extent to which national policy legal frameworks provide adequate safeguards for local land and resource access rights, and effective mechanisms for local participation in decision making, will frame whether increased ethanol investments and initiatives will translate into new opportunities for or further marginalization of local communities. More powerful individuals and groups of people have greater access to resources such as irrigated land.

The trajectory of the Chisumbanje case revealed that the investors are struggling to have a balanced model in relation to fair compensation to the local people for land and losses in crops. The Chisumbanje case reflects that the immense potential opportunities anticipated in diverting a natural resource such as land and water from the small scale farmer to the large scale commercial farming project require greater stakeholder coherence in approach to address design elements, while working collaboratively to ensure that no one party of prejudiced. Empirical study of the Chisumbanje case shows that there are both positive and negative consequences of the project. There is a compelling case for more grounded community development approaches beyond the company for the local people to secure their livelihoods. The locals feel disempowered for now and more marginalized, despite some of them getting menial jobs. In the long-term, there is a need for an incremental development approach to level the playing field for a win-win situation for the company and the local communities, only if and when dialogue commences across the actors.

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[1] Here a community may loose land rights, but can regain livelihoods through having access to water and technology. Yet, the company my loose when government does not allow for the retailing of ethanol on an investment that they would have allowed thus contributing to company losses.

[2]Southern African Development Community, 2011. Regional Agricultural Policy - Country Summary Agricultural Policy Review Reports, [pdf] Available at: <http://www.sadc.int/fanr/docs/rap/RAP Combined Summary Reports- 8 May 2011.pdf < [Accessed 2012].

[3] Interview, Rafael Zuze (Assistant General Manager) Green Fuel, 14 May 2014, Green Fuel Boardroom, Chisumbanje

[4] Interview, Rafael Zuze (Assistant General Manager) Green Fuel, 14 May 2014, Green Fuel Boardroom, Chisumbanje

[5] Previously known as the Rhodesia Cane Farmers Association

[6] Previously known as the Rhodesia Sugar Association

[7] http://www.thecropsite.com/reports/?id=3785#sthash.PYIzYrTY.dpuf

[8] http://www.thecropsite.com/reports/?id=3785#sthash.PYIzYrTY.dpuf

[9] Ian Scoones, Southern African sugar: new trends and opportunities, March 3 2014

[10] USDA, ‘Zimbabwe Sugar Annual’, 15 April 2014 http://www.thefarmsite.com/reports/contents/ZimbabweSugar28April2014.pdf

[11] http://www.huletts.co.za/ops/zimbabwe/zimbabwe.asp

[12] http://www.huletts.co.za/ops/zimbabwe/zimbabwe.asp

[13] Key informant interview, 11 May 2014, Chisumbanje

[14] Key informant interview, 11 May 2014, Chisumbanje

[15] Key informant interview, 11 May 2014, Chisumbanje

[16] Interview, Chief Garahwa, 07 May 2014, Chief Garahwa’s residence, Garahwa

[17] Key informant interview, 11 May 2014, Chisumbanje

[18] Interview, MP Chipinge South, Enock Porusingazi

[19] Interview, Rafael Zuze (Assistant General Manager) Green Fuel, 14 May 2014, Green Fuel Boardroom, Chisumbanje

[20] Interview, Rafael Zuze (Assistant General Manager) Green Fuel, 14 May 2014, Green Fuel Boardroom, Chisumbanje

[21] Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Youth, Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Public Hearing on Chisumbanje Ethanol Plant, Chisumbanje, Chipinge District, 11 July 2014

[22]Herbert Moyo, 2013. Ethanol project: the other side of the story, 13 December, The Zimbabwe Independent, Harare. http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2013/12/13/ethanol-project-side-story/

[23]Chisumbanje villagers furious over lack of consultation for Ethanol project: http://swradioafrica.com/pages/ethanolproject230811.htm

[24] MoU, Macdom Investments (Private) Limited and ARDA Chisumbanje Settler Scheme Farmers, 27 September, 2013

[25] Interview, Rafael Zuze (Assistant General Manager) Green Fuel, 14 May 2014, Green Fuel Boardroom, Chisumbanje

[26] Key informant interview, 07 May 2014, Chisumbanje

[27] Interview, Rafael Zuze (Assistant General Manager) Green Fuel, 14 May 2014, Green Fuel Boardroom, Chisumbanje

[28] Elson Maara, Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Public Hearing, 11 July 2014, Chisumbanje Primary School, Chisumbanje

[29] MoU, Macdom Investments (Private) Limited and ARDA Chisumbanje Settler Scheme Farmers, 27 September, 2013

[30] Snapshot survey, 21-22 August 2014, Harare

[31] Key informant interview, 11 May 2014, Chisumbanje

[32] Interview, Rafael Zuze (Assistant General Manager) Green Fuel, 14 May 2014, Green Fuel Boardroom, Chisumbanje

[33] Interview, Rafael Zuze (Assistant General Manager) Green Fuel, 14 May 2014, Green Fuel Boardroom, Chisumbanje

[34] Interview, Tafadzwa (SHE Manager), Green Fuel, 14 August 2014, during a tour of the plant in Chisumbanje

[35]Newsday (Zimbabwe), Zimbabwe to save 2 million on fuel imports, 18 February 2013.

[36] Address to Parliament, Deputy Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, Arthur Mutambara, Harare, Zimbabwe, 20 February 2013.

[37]Interview, Rafael Zuze (Assistant General Manager) Green Fuel, 14 May 2014, Green Fuel Boardroom, Chisumbanje

[38]Interview, Ropafadzo Gwanetsa (Community Officer) Green Fuel, 14 August 2014, during a tour of the plant in Chisumbanje

[39] Key informant interview, 11 May 2014, Chisumbanje

[40]Interview, Ropafadzo Gwanetsa (Community Officer) Green Fuel, 14 August 2014, during a tour of the plant in Chisumbanje

[41] Key informant interview, 11 May 2014, Chisumbanje

[42] Interview, Chief Garahwa, 07 May 2014, Chief Garahwa’s residence, Garahwa

[43] Key informant interview, 11 May 2014, Chisumbanje

[44] Interview, Chief Garahwa, 07 May 2014, Chief Garahwa’s residence, Garahwa

[45] Interview, Rafael Zuze (Assistant General Manager) Green Fuel, 14 May 2014, Green Fuel Boardroom, Chisumbanje

[46] Interview, Rafael Zuze (Assistant General Manager) Green Fuel, 14 May 2014, Green Fuel Boardroom, Chisumbanje

[47] Key informant interview, 07 May 2014, Chisumbanje

[48] MoU, Macdom Investments (Private) Limited and ARDA Chisumbanje Settler Scheme Farmers, 27 September, 2013

[49] Elson Maara, Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Public Hearing, 11 July 2014, Chisumbanje Primary School, Chisumbanje

[50] MoU, Macdom Investments (Private) Limited and ARDA Chisumbanje Settler Scheme Farmers, 27 September, 2013

[51] Interview, Ropafadzo Gwanetsa (Community Officer) Green Fuel, 14 August 2014, during a tour of the plant in Chisumbanje

[52] Interview, Rafael Zuze (Assistant General Manager) Green Fuel, 14 May 2014, Green Fuel Boardroom, Chisumbanje

[53] Interview, Ropafadzo Gwanetsa (Community Officer) Green Fuel, 14 August 2014, during a tour of the plant in Chisumbanje

[54] FDG, 07 May 2014, Chisumbanje

Thursday, 25 April 2019

Saturday, 28 May 2016

Tuesday, 18 November 2014