Abstract
The Chisumbanje ethanol investment has
captured the emotions, imaginations and captivated Zimbabweans to dialogue on
broader economic development and the issue of large scale land investments.
Underpinning this intense dialogue are real matters of livelihoods and the
meaning of land for people, balancing economic development versus resources
ownership, especially for the rural communities in the vicinity of the ethanol
project. Sensitivities arise when communal land becomes the target for
investments, with a potential to move communities. Noise has been raised on
such land possession; however, there is no consensus nor evidence of what is
actually taking place on the ground in Chisumbanje. The paper explores the
nature of land dislocation, land resettlement plans, compensation of the
affected communities, and the nature of the contract model where communities
cede or use land rights to negotiate economic benefits. The issues go beyond
the technical investment, but towards better understanding of the distribution
of costs and benefits to local communities, the private sector (investing
companies), government (as a shareholder in private markets). The paper
examines the impact of the investments on land and other resources on the local
communities, which provides different nuances in Chisumbanje. In our deeper
analysis we decipher whether the African Union’s (AU) Framework and Guidelines
(F&G) for Land Policy in Africa of 2009, are being followed given the
development of benchmarks against which to measure country performance on land
governance (African Union 2009). Our analysis encompasses the core issues that
require investigation on the varied land governance structures and implications
for local communities, the wider economy and sustainable use of natural
resources upon, which the majority of the poor depend on. Land investments such
as Chisumbanje ethanol project are key to measure good land governance, which
requires to be socialized not just at the national level, but at the local
level where most of the actions take place.
An assessment will be made on whether at grassroots there are better or
worse livelihood enhancement practices, and whether the developments benefiting
all or some members within the communities and does this ratio justify the
existence of such an investment?
Key
words: economic
empowerment, conflicts, land grab, displacement, ethanol blending,
contestations in sugar investment, land investment
1.
INTRODUCTION
1.1
Purpose and objectives
Zimbabwe’s investments in agriculture
after a contested Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) underpinned by land
occupations permeated by violence, which was largely contained by the state by
2005, has triggered a debated on the meaning and import of “international land
grabs” (Matondi, 2015, forthcoming).
The debates internationally have been increasingly, while the substance and
content of it has become weak with each passing. It is in respect of the
emerging trends, that we sought to decipher the meaning of “land grabs”,
“international land grabs” and “agricultural investments” as these mean
different things in different context. A key observation that provides
contrarian in analysis, is the material fact that the FTLRP was an “internal”,
instigated and implemented programme that does not conform to externally driven
“land grabs” of an international nature. Based on this differentiation, this
his paper sought to understand: 1) the interest and role of Zimbabwe
government, and its contribution to the
first large scale private investments undertaken by Green Fuel in Chisumbanje;
2) the role of the local institutions be they technical or administrative in
facilitating and mediating in investment; 3) establishing the capacity of local
and national institutions to structure agreements on behalf of the local
communities, that would be favorable to the communities; 4) identify the role,
interests and benefits of Green Fuel as domestic investors.
In order to answer these broad
questions, field work at the local level in Chisumbanje was key in interfacing
with the traditional leaders as representatives of the community, who also have
a rich history of understanding the land ownership and transfer matters. Yet,
we were also aware that through history, colonial and post-colonial land
ownership has been a site of struggle by a variety of interest groups. Yet, the
Green Fuel investments was not just an expression of land ownership and use,
but the whole genre of economic development, and the path that agriculture
needs to take into the future. Interrogating, the role of government as a land
authority and its capacity to work with local communities and Green Fuel was a
key aspect of this research work. Nonetheless, government functionaries, in the
form of the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) with a long
history in the area shape our understanding of modernization and development,
it being a colonial construct of the 1960s in particular, when the Rhodesian
colonial government sought strategically Import Substitution Policy, across its
economy, and in particular in the energy sector where ethanol and bio-diesel
became investments of necessity.
While arguments are awash that ethanol
blending is not new, key questions remain because vehicle technologies have
also changed. Instead of leaded fuel, unleaded was introduced because of the
harmful effects of lead. Yet, engine efficiencies of vehicles improved on the
basis of gasoline than blends. However, some countries notably Brazil and
United States of America, as well as Europe also moved top design vehicles and
kits to ensure use of ethanol blends. Therefore, newness can be redefined
technologically, yet for land adopters as in African countries some of these
technologies may be unavailable. This is
the import, of the national political contestations over ethanol blending that
during the times of the inclusive government, took the nation by storm. With
the new mandatory blending to E20 policy this paper seeks to examine whether
the government policies are supporting local rights and claims or whether they
are in alignment with the interests of the large-scale investors. In all this,
in what ways do the community and the company putting money is a perceived risk
market, contribute or have an equal standing in their roles and interests being
met? Are locals and the private
domestic company considered to a key player with a say in the distributive
issues beneficiation, and compensation for losses incurred[1].
It was this critical to examine the roles played by the various stakeholders
involved the overarching question of large investments in agriculture, in a
country that has seen more flight of investors than attracting them.
1.2
Framing the key questions and issues
The
conceptual approach adopted for the Developmental Economy Analysis (DEA) of the
large investments is an “issue or problem-driven analysis”, which comprises
four conceptual components and four strategic issues, and these are: 1)
Development governance: focuses on the effectiveness of the state and private
sector in managing a contested policy process on ethanol as a subset of energy,
and how strategies and programs were designed to implement the project
effectively, solving problems as they arise, being responsive to issues and
challenges faced in the project. In addition, for the project to take root, we
assessed the decision making, and governmental systems and processes at play,
in mediating issues that arose. The Chisumbanje project managed to build
comprehensive processes of stakeholder engagement, in which positioning was
critical for wider interests. An expectation of openness in the project was
high on the agenda, yet private sector operates differently and is bound by
ethics of not revealing its business model, like a public entity.
Yet,
when working in local communities, it is paramount to take on board the views
of minorities and the voices of the most vulnerable in society in
decision-making; 2. The framework also took a power analysis to addresses
questions on the project systems, structures and processes: Who are the
drivers/blockers to large investments and why? Who sets the policy agenda?
Whose ideas and values dominate policy? Who gets what, when, and how? How do
formal institutions shape the distribution of costs and benefits? How do
informal social networks shape policy processes? Power analysis places emphasis
on understanding the formal and informal development landscape. It acknowledges
aspects of context such as culture, convention, and systems of shared belief.
Cast in a framework of broader development, power falls in five categories: 1)
economic mobilization and winning support for project; 2) use of soft forms of lobby
to get benefits; 3) use of technical skills to induce economic opportunities;
4) control of economic institutions for beneficiation; and 5) control of
knowledge and information.
1.3
Data
collection methods
·
Overview: Questions, which required qualitative approaches,
included: can household livelihood change be attributed to the land investments
or something else? What choices of livelihood activities and production
strategies are now in place? What are the effects of the land investments on
detrimental risk coping strategies, and what are the attitudes to risk change
as a consequence of the land investments? What are the main constraints
(whether linked to networks, physical access, etc.) faced by households in
engaging in labour ties in Green Fuel’s activities and how do these influence
behaviours and choices? At the local economy level, the qualitative methods enabled us to answer
questions on how the local
community, are benefitting or not economically from the investment through
multiplier effects of new income streams on local goods, services and labour
markets, although these are being mediated by the political, economic and
social context. At the social
networks level, we intended to establish how land investments increase beneficial risk sharing
arrangements and economic collaboration underpinned by social capital (trust-
based reciprocity). Through qualitative approaches we were able to answer some
of the following questions: What were social
networks like before the land investments and how did they relate to
livelihoods? How are existing social and
support networks affected by the land investments? What is the importance placed upon changing social networks
by community members (i.e. is the fact that networks are being affected by the
land investments considered ‘important’ by people in the community)? How is
this traded off against other programme impacts (i.e. do the overall benefits
from the income gained for instance in Chisumbanje make up for any negative
social effects that may arise)? Which networks
are most affected and why? Which are the strongest networks and why? Has
the investments triggered the creation of new
networks? If so, how? Which ones? Is there an increase in networks that extend
beyond the reference community? What effect does this have on social
relationships?
·
Field research protocols:The field research protocol was a very hard exercise due to the
political nature of the investment under study. We started by sending letters
of request from the Ministry of Agriculture Mechanization and Irrigation
Development, Ministry of Local Government and Public Housing, Ministry of
Energy and Power Development and it took three months for us to get the
authorisation from these ministries. When we got the authorisation we went to
the Provincial Administrator, Manicaland, the District Administrator, Chipinge
District, Chief Garahwa, the police in Chisumbanje, the MP for Chisumbanje,
local councillors in Chisumbanje, the President’s Office in Chisumbanje as our
entry points before we approached the Headmen for the various villages.
However, this rigorous exercise served as a policy influence as all those
approached are key in policy influencing on the investment.
·
Approaches in the field: The research used a combination of qualitative and quantitative
approaches. The research team offered the most comprehensive design of
qualitative survey to generate new knowledge at 3 levels: household, local
economy and livelihoods, and social networks. At the household level, the
quantitative methods allowed us to answer some of these questions on how the
land investment is assumed to improve the livelihood choices and productive
investments. One hundred and twenty questionnaires were administered in Chinyamukwakwa
and Chisumbanje (60 in Chinyamukwakwa and 60 in Chisumbanje). Middle Sabi was
isolated as there are no people affected by the land grabs as Rating
Investments (the company that is growing sugarcane in Middle Sabi) has resorted
to the 3500ha original ARDA land in Middle Sabi. Through qualitative
approaches; (4 Focus Group Discussions, 3 in Chisumbanje, 1 in Chinyamukwakwa,
10 business interviews (3 in Chinyamukwakwa and 7 at Checheche) targeting the
informal sector, formal and banking; observations in-depth interviews and
personalised stories; and informal/off the record interviews, we established
how and why local communities are making decisions on livelihoods through
examining the changes brought by land investments.
·
Official interviews: We had interviews with the CEO of Chipinge Rural District Council, the
local Member of Parliament for Chipinge South, Cde Enock Porusingazi, Assistant
General Manager, Green Fuels, Rafael Zuze, Community Officer-Green Fuels,
Ropafadzo Gwanetsa, Headman Chisumbanje, and Chief Garahwa. We tried in vain to
have an interview with the Chairman of ARDA, Mr Basil Nyabadza who initially
agreed for an interview with us but later withdrew without giving any reasons.
A scheduled interview with the District Administrator for Chipinge also failed
to take off due to the politics associated with the project. After the
interview with green Fuel officials which we felt they did not open up, we
posted a blog on the internet and they got hold of it felt the blog was one
sided and proposed that we meet them and discuss a possible return to the
field. We then met with Nicole Mollet who is the Community Social
Responsibility Manager at Green Fuel (who is also wife to the new General
Manager, Conrad Rautenbach, son to Conrad “Billy” Rautenbach-the investor). She
arranged for our return to Chisumbanje and we had a tour of the sugar cane
fields and a tour of the plant where we had interview with the SHE Manager at
Green Fuel, an agronomist with Green Fuel, the Manager for Small Scale Irrigation
Schemes, and the Community Officer, Ropafadzo Gwanetsa who gave us a full
interview on agriculture and production.
1.4
Background to the study and the field site
To date, Zimbabwe has not developed a
comprehensive national agricultural policy. However, an overall vision has been
outlined, which is “to promote development of an efficient, competitive and
sustainable agriculture sector, which assures food security and increased
income.”[2] In
line with this vision, the agricultural
sector policy that is being formulated aims to increase production for both
household and national food security; increase funding for agricultural
infrastructure and the sector; improve produce quality; improve production
technology; preserve natural resources; and effectively manage and administrate
land reform. The Hippo Valley Estates is protected by the Hippo Valley Act that
was drawn up in November 1964 between the Rhodesian government and Sir Raymond
Stockil representing the company. The government, through a Crown Charter,
ceded 70 872 morgen of land to Hippo Valley to develop an irrigation scheme. A
Dutch morgen is about 0, 85 hectares. The government cannot under the current
legal regime compulsorily acquire land owned by the company. The repealing of
the Hippo Valley Act will empower the government to acquire the land including
infrastructure and equipment on the farms. The Chisumbanje and Middle Sabi
Estates are protected by the ARDA Act as the land belongs to ARDA and it is a
partnership between ARDA and Macdom and Rating Investments.
The Chisumbanje project is a
public-private partnership between the government through the parastatal
Agriculture and Rural Development Authority (ARDA), and local investors Green
Fuel with subsidiary companies (Macdom and Ratings Pvt Ltd.). The project
utilizes ARDA estates to grow sugarcane for ethanol blending. The Chisumbanje
Ethanol Plant (Green Fuels) is a joint venture operation between Macdom
Investments (Zimbabwean private investment company owned by Billy Conrad
Rautenbach, a white Zimbabwe who was born and grew up in Zimbabwe) and the
government of Zimbabwe represented by its Agricultural investment arm ARDA. It
started as Built-Operate-Transfer and later on changed to a joint venture. ARDA owns the land whilst two companies,
Macdom Investments in Chisumbanje and Rating Investments in Middle Sabi provide
for the sugar cane to Green Fuels which then produces the ethanol.[3] Government through ARDA invested US$36, 7 in
land and immovable assets and Macdom Investments injected the capital and holds
90% stake in Green Fuel whilst the government has got 10% stake. The total
investment into Green Fuel is US$300 million rather than the US$600 being said
in the media and the machine was imported from Brazil.[4]
The proprietors of Green Fuel point out that the company fulfils the
Indigenization Policy requirement of 51/49 ratio (state/external investors) as
well as the 10% community ownership scheme which most investments have complied
or have put in place plans to comply with the regulations.
The study explored the political and
policy positioning of the project at the national level, in terms of the power
play, the actors and the implications of the investment for the national
economy and related controversial issues around consumer behavior on the final
product (blended fuel) that has received mixed reactions, but has been
legislated and whose level of blending has been staggered at policy. While the
Green Fuel was the key player, from the beginning of the year, the government
opened up to other companies, hence the Chiredzi sugar production cluster has
re-joined ethanol blending as well, thus in a way liberalizing the production
and marketing of blended fuel with scope for inducing competitiveness. The
implication of this liberation is yet to be assessed. However, most of our
research focused in the areas of production of sugarcane and it’s processing,
in future we equally need to trace the governance of the sugarcane value chain
to identify the actors winning and those loosing, with a view for advocacy to
limit damage on the poor.
2.
LARGE SCALE SUGARCANE INVESTMENTS FROM A GLOBAL AND
NATIONAL LENS
2.1
Land, agriculture and investments guidelines
2.1.1
International
guidelines and relevance for Zimbabwe
Of the major initiatives taken lately at an
international level to regulate large-scale land deals, is the formulation of
international guidelines including the World Bank Principles for Responsible
Agricultural Investment; the FAO Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible
Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests as well as; the Minimum
Core Human Rights Principles of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food.
The FAO Voluntary Guideline on the Responsible Governance of Tenure, endorsed
by the Committee on World Food Security in May 2012, is a widely publicized and
the most recent global initiative for the regulation of land tenure in general
and large-scale farm investments in particular. The FAO guideline is more
inclusive than the World Bank principles in its formulation process (White et
al., 2012); it is also a lot more ‘holistic’ in its approach whereby land
rights are characterized of being “inextricably linked with access to and
management of other natural resources” (Preface of the FAO Voluntary
Guidelines, 2012). This is an important approach in the context of the
Chisumbanje Ethanol investment wherein loss of land use rights by local
communities has brought about a wide range of consequences in terms of loss of
access to various other natural resources, including water, grazing lands and
forest woods, on which local livelihoods highly depended.
In Zimbabwe there remains no clear land policy
to guide land administration. The Chisumbanje Ethanol Investment provide an
example of ad hoc land administration, there is no clarity on how it fits into the wider context of land reform which
supports small holder commercial
agriculture. One possible way of enforcing of such voluntary international
guidelines is through their incorporation into national laws which then give
rise to statutory rights and responsibilities. This however reinforces the
state-centric approach in the governance of land deals; since it gives the
ultimate discretion for states to decide on whether or not to incorporate such
principles into state law, and thus opt for or against their applicability.
2.1.2
Critique of the guideline
for responsible investment and their application to Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe is not a signatory to the international guidelines and
principles and the principles do not reflect that the current expansion of
large scale agro-investments most often takes place in competition with
smallholder agriculture for land and water and lead to conflicts with and
alienation and displacement of rural populations. Large scale agro-investments
are highly mechanized and require little labour. In addition they promote
monoculture and the undermining of biological diversity. A fundamental problem with large scale
agro-investments, as evidenced by research from Latin America, are that their
technical, agro-ecological, economic and social features make them unable to
promote sustainable development (Fernandes et al. 2012; Coulson 2013).
In essence, the rai principles take the high moral ground in arguing for
protection of smallholders, the environment and the climate but make no attempt
to operationalise the principles by placing responsibilities with different
types of investors. Hence some agro-investors, e.g. that are large scale, may
not fully understand how the principles relate to their activities and may not
feel sufficiently challenged by the principles to act in their spirit. Recent
research show, however, that African states, instead of protecting and
supporting their own smallholders, have been more inclined to align themselves
with large-scale investors and agri-business, both foreign and domestic
(Matondi et al. 2011; Coulson 2013).
The rai principles, which are voluntary, are insufficient to address the
real problems and challenges unfolding in relation to different types of
agricultural investments. This is mainly due to lack of operationalisation in
terms of targeting or placing responsibilities of various implications of
agro-investments with different categories of investors. Rai will therefore
have problems in relating to real issues on the ground and in particular to
conflicts between different scales of agricultural investment. These features
of rai are likely to render them ineffective in promoting responsible
agro-investments. The draft rai remains inside the frame of the dominant states
and regions and will be unable to challenge their drive and support for large
scale agro-investments. As to smallholders, the draft rai emphasises
protection, not support and development. Hence attention is taken away from the
important potential that smallholder agriculture regimes have for enhancing
food security, nutrition and sustainable development.
2.1.3
National
guidelines
Zimbabwe last developed its land policy in the 1990s with an
objective of redistributing about 5 miillion hectares of commercial land for
resettlement on a willing buyer willing seller basis. There were various
attempts of revising the policy at the end of the 1990s without success but the
programme for land transfere continued anyway, which facilitated engagement
between civil society, government,
funding agencies and the international community towards developing a programme
of ressettlement, but this was overtaken by event, leading to FTLR. Government
have to rely on a raft of legal instruments and constitutional ammendments to
effect FTRL because it had no policy underpining it. And these legal
instruments became de facto policy
but limited only to land as as resource, less importance was placed on
fisheries, conservancies because key priority was transfer of land from those
with the land to those without, but all
done internally. Therefore, though the international guidelines were developed
in principle, hardly do they speak to
Zimbabwe land reform, besides they speak to issues around energy, food
security, income all with specific policies therefore harmonising them with
land will be something nice to to do.
The
Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority (ZERA) is the legal entity that issued
Green Fuel with a blending license in August 2013. The Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority (ZERA) was
created in September 2011 following the promulgation of the Energy Regulatory
Act (Chapter 13:23) which provides for regulation of the energy sector and
other sections not provided for by the energy laws, the Electricity Act (13:19)
and Petroleum Act (13:22). The Energy Regulatory Act repealed some sections
especially those related to the formation of the regulatory institutions
in the Electricity Act (Chapter 13:19) and Petroleum Act (Chapter 13:22). The
mandate of ZERA is to regulate the Energy Sector in Zimbabwe. The
Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority says mandatory E10 ethanol fuel blend is
safe for all petrol cars but was silent on the effects of E15 and E20 on
engines and automobiles’ performances. Government introduced mandatory E10
blending with effect from October 15 2014. ZERA commissioned a Consultancy for
Development of a Fuel Quality and Bio Fuels Policy Framework and initial
recommendations are that use of current levels of ethanol blends is safe. The
study also identified risks and mitigation strategies to deal with higher
blending levels targeting the Zimbabwean fleet. Other regulatory institutions that
have a role in the Chisumbanje ethanol project include, the Environmental
Management Agency-that supervise the whether an environmental assessment
programme has been carried out before the establishment of the plant, the
National Social Security Authority (NSSA) whose mandate is to ensure social
security for the workers at the plant.
2.2
Enforcement and mediating institutions for
responsible investments
2.2.1
State
institutional framework
The
main parastatal that is involved in the Chisumbanje Ethanol Investment is the
Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) that is the government’s
agricultural development parastatal under the Ministry of Agriculture,
Mechanization and Irrigation Development (MoAMID). ARDA was formed in 1965 with
its major role to boost agricultural production and rural development as well
as productive utilization of State land.
ARDA through MoAMID was
central in the initial offer of land on a lease basis to Zimbabwe Bio-Energy
Company, which in the case of Chisumbanje trade as Green Fuels. Yet, all land
is owned by the state and administered by the Ministry of Lands and Rural
Resettlement (MLRR), which to date has not provided a statement on the
Chisumbanje project, this ostensibly, because the land is statutorily owned by
MoAMID.
2.2.2
Local
institutional structures
The land that the ethanol project is falls
under the jurisdiction of the Chipinge Rural District Council and they are a
key stakeholder in the process because in terms of the laws of the country that
is communal land that is administered by the local authority. The role of the
local authority comes in on the land; if the company needs to expand they need
to engage the Chipinge Rural District Council as they are the land authority.
The allocation of the 0.5ha to the farmers who lost their land is a process
which involves the Rural District Council, the company, Agritex and the
Department of Irrigation in the Ministry of Agriculture and allocation was
based on those that lost their land during expansion. When the investment expanded
into the Chisumbanje area, which is communal, but earmarked for the ethanol
project, that is when the 0.5ha compensation were factored in. According to the
Chipinge Rural District Council, the people knew that the area was earmarked
for expansion and no one build houses in the land they cultivated. The settler
farmers have got leases with the Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement and
Council has leased the land where ARDA or now Macdom is occupying and the 0.5ha
small scale schemes.
2.2.3
Traditional
leaders
Chief Garahwa noted that when Green Fuel came in, they made promises to
him as a chief and to the community as a whole, which they are now not
fulfilling and the investment is no longer benefiting the community as promised
when the company came in. According to Chief Garahwa problems aroused when ARDA
invaded peoples land, when it was common knowledge that ARDA had its own land
which was fenced and everyone knew the boundaries. During the process of the
invasion of people’s land, the company destroyed crops which were ready for
harvesting. Though these crops were compensated, it was not to the delight of
the local people. Headman Chisumbanje presiding over 16 villages with 10 of
the 16 affected by the land displacement carried out by Macdom Investments,
pointed out that people used to grow maize for food and cotton as a cash crop
and we were able to build our houses using proceeds from cotton. During better
seasons we would sell excess grain to the GMB. Now that most families have lost
their land we can no longer grow food and cotton for sale, even our cattle do
not have anywhere to graze. However, the Chief and the Headman admitted that
they were consulted on behalf of the community and that is why he carried a
traditional ceremony to bless the investment and has been taking all the
problems that have risen to the District Administrator.
2.2.4
Farmer
organizations and commodity associations
There
are four farmer organizations in Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe Farmers Union, Zimbabwe
Commercial Farmer Union, Commercial Farmers Union and the National Farmers
Union of Zimbabwe who all represent farmer interests in Zimbabwe and have got
farmers under their association in Chisumbanje. However, they do not have
farmers they represent who are producing sugar cane in Chisumbanje neither do
they support the farmers in Chisumbanje on sugar production. However in an interview with CFU, they feel
that the project is a fantastic project with a good potential and is a great
investment of national strategic importance. The CFU pointed out that the
project can be made perfect by creating small scale satellite sugar cane
farmers who will then supply the company with sugar cane.
In
the sugar sector, there are three farmer associations registered with the Sugar
Association that represent the interests of the private sugar cane farmers,
namely: the Zimbabwe Sugar Cane Development Association, the Commercial Sugar
Cane Farmers of Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe Cane Farmers Association. The “Successful Rural Sugar Cane Farming
Community project” (SusCo) aimed at rehabilitating private farmers to increase
their supply of sugar cane is still on-going. The project is supported by
Tongaat Hulett and funded by a local bank. It seeks to accelerate the private
farmer sugarcane re-planting in order to increase sugar cane output from this
sector to the potential of 1.4 MMT from 15,880 hectares by 2015.
2.2.5
Civil society
players and consumer organizations
The Platform for Youth Development (PYD) is the most significant
pressure group that has been “fighting for the rights of the community” in
Chisumbanje. Platform for Youth Development has
been working with the villagers on this matter since 2008. PYD has engaged
Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights who filed a court application at the high
court of Zimbabwe to stop Macdom Pvt Ltd and her sister companies from
encroaching the boundaries they have since agreed with ARDA. PYD was also involved in the now defunct District
Ethanol Production Committee (DEPIC) with its Chairman/Director being the
spokesperson of DEPIC. International
civil society players from Switzerland, FEPA, KASA and SOLIFONDS petitioned the ethanol investor, Green
Fuel and its owner Billy Rautenbach to respect and honor existing land
boundaries and ensure that the local Chisumbanje and Chinyamukwakwa villagers
continue to survive and feed their families. FEPA, KASA, SOLIFONDS and other
partners urged Rautenbach to respect dialogue with Chisumbanje and
Chinyamukwakwa communities as a way of solving the existing land conflict.
3.
GENESIS OF ETHANOL PRODUCTION IN ZIMBABWE: PACESETTERS AND RISK TAKERS
3.1
Sugar production sector
and ethanol production
3.1.1
Historical
antecedent
Thomas Murray Macdougall grew the first
sugarcane at Triangle Limited around 1934. The first settler farmers were
introduced to Triangle in 1954. In 1956, Sir Roy Stockil formed Hippo Valley
Estates Limited and farmed sugarcane. Settler farmers were introduced in Hippo
Valley between 1960 and 1964. Both Triangle Limited and Hippo Valley Estates
Limited are in Chiredzi District, which is Masvingo Province today. In 1962,
the Zimbabwe Cane Farmers Association[5]
was established to coordinate the common interests of independent, non-miller
sugarcane farmers. Today, there are three growers’ associations representing
approximately 1 000 independent non miller sugarcane farmers, namely: Zimbabwe
Cane Farmers Association [ZCFA], Commercial Sugarcane Farmers Association of
Zimbabwe [CSFAZ], and Zimbabwe Sugarcane Development Association [ZSDA]. The
independent outgrowers farm approximately 16 000 ha of sugarcane. In 1963, the
Zimbabwe Sugar Association [ZSA][6]
was formed to represent the interest of sugarcane growers, millers, and sugar
refineries. In 1963, Zimbabwe Sugar Sales Pvt Ltd [ZSS] was established to
market all raw sugar, and today markets both raw and processed sugar produced
by the millers. In 1974, Triangle and Hippo Valley purchased Mkwasine Estate
and converted part of it to growing sugarcane. By 1980, 1 910 hectares of
Mkwasine Estate was sold to 191 small scale and 1 290 hectares to eight large
scale sugarcane outgrowers. Triangle Limited established Mwenezana Estates in
Mwenezi District, Masvingo Province, to grow sugarcane on about 4 000 hectares.
The Zimbabwe sugar industry developed rapidly. The Lowveld area proved to be
ideal for sugarcane cultivation, with good alluvial soils and semi-arid
continental climate. . Sustained production of sugarcane would occur subject to
the availability of adequate water for irrigation. To this end the Sugar
Industry, in conjunction with the Government, invested in extensive irrigation
systems, including the construction of Mutirikwi and Manjirenji dams and canals
to harness water provided by five major rivers that traverse through the
Lowveld.
The
production and use of biofuels in the form of ethanol has been a part of
Zimbabwe for over decades in what could be described as an “on-off
relationship”. As early as the 1960’s, the country has been documented to have
been utilising ethanol for blending. The
Zimbabwean government began the ethanol project in 1963 (when it was still
Rhodesia) and continued when it attained independence in 1980, it continued
blending ethanol with petrol until 1992 when the severe drought and (Shumba et
al, 2010) due to uncompetitiveness price wise with gasoline from the Middle
East that had gotten to be much more cheaper production wise and at landing
cost on Harare. This reduced the production of both ethanol and sugar to nearly
zero (Mutanga et. al, 2013). The ethanol production was motivated by the
international sanctions imposed on the former Rhodesian authority, security of
supply, foreign currency savings and low sugar prices. In 1975 Triangle Sugar
Pvt Ltd decided to use surplus molasses from up to 40 000tonnes of sugar for
ethanol production and started production in 1979. A German Company, Gerbr
Hermman, supplied the plant design at a cost of US$6.4 million capable of
producing 40 million litres a year.
In 2005, for the same reason and
conditions (as in the Rhodesian era) ethanol was reintroduced. On the 8th
of June 2006, through National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM), Government of
Zimbabwe (GoZ) entered into an agreement with Triangle Sugar Pvt Ltd for the
production and delivery of ethanol to NOCZIM for fuel blending. Ethanol
production at Triangle stands at 25 million litres a year, with 5 million
litres used internally by the company and leaving 20 million available for
blending-falling short of the national requirement for blending at 10% of
imported fossil fuels which requires about 100 million litres per annum. In
2007, serious plans to moot the production of ethanol from sugar cane were
mooted through a private public partnership between the government and Zimbabwe
Bio-Energy Company in Mwenezi. The project dragged on and on and has not yet
been established.
The year 2011 was to be the dawn of
yet another new chapter in Zimbabwe’s relentless pursuit of the seemingly
highly elusive biofuels programme. A US$ 300 million ethanol plant project was
established at Chisumbanje in the Chipinge District of Manicaland province. The
plant was set up on a joint venture partnership between the GoZ, Agricultural
Rural Development Agency (ARDA), and a private investor, Green Fuels Pvt (Ltd),
with producing companies in Chisumbanje being Macdom Pvt Ltd, and Ratings Pvt
Ltd in Middle Sabi. On the 6th of
February 2012, the plant shut down its operation (Bulawayo 24, 1 May 2012)
citing numerous challenges which it was facing putting 4,500 workers at the
risk of losing their jobs. Some of the problems that have been highlighted in
different press reports include failure to secure a ready market for its
ethanol as government had not made fuel blending mandatory (Bulawayo 24, 1 May
2012). This consequently led to a situation where there was an accumulation of
the ethanol stock at the plant as it was not selling. However, the government
in 2013 gazette Statutory Instrument 17 of 2013 (Mandatory Blending of
Anhydrous Ethanol with Unleaded Petrol) which was published on the 12th of
February 2013. The instrument stipulates that all licensed procurers and
wholesalers of unleaded fuel must only do so after ensuring it has been blended with a minimum 10% of ethanol (E10)
produced by a licensed producer.
3.1.2
Resource base and
ownership
Sugarcane in Zimbabwe is produced in
the south-eastern lowveld area partly embedded in Masvingo and Manicaland
Provinces under irrigation. There are three groups of sugar cane producers: the
large estates, large scale farmers and newly resettled farmers. Three large
estates, Triangle (for sugar and ethanol production), Hippo Valley (for sugar
production) and Green Fuel (for ethanol production only) have about 53,500
hectares of sugar cane land and produce in excess of 3.0 Million Metric Tonnes
(MMT) of sugar cane or approximately 80 percent of the total cane crop. Tongaat
Hulett, a large South African agricultural and agro-processing business, wholly
owns Triangle Estates and has 50.3 percent shareholding in Hippo Valley[7].
Large scale farmers and newly resettled farmers collectively produce 20 percent
of the crop.
In the 2011/12 MY, Tongaat Hulett
together with a local bank established a four year US$20 million loan revolving
facility to enhance sugar cane production growth. The project is currently
providing inputs on loan to at least 670 of the 872 newly resettled sugar cane
farmers. The private cane farmers are receiving assistance with tillage
services, cane replanting and extension services to improve cane yields and
extractable sugar content. Cane yield per hectare, however, is expected to
increase as good summer rains from December 2013 to March 2014, improved the
availability of irrigation water in supply dams.[8] In
the 2013/14 MY, Zimbabwe harvested 3.9 MMT of sugar cane on 46,605 hectares,
marginally less than the 4.0 MMT on 53,486 hectares. The marginal decrease in
cane production was mainly due to the effects of the 2012/13 drought that
reduced the rate of cane expansion and root replanting.
3.1.3
Sugarcane Contribution
to the Economy
Zimbabwe's economy is
dependent on agricultural products including tobacco, cotton and sugar cane.
Major export commodities are tobacco and horticulture. Other crops like sugar,
tea, coffee, cotton, seeds, maize, small grains and oilseeds are also exported.
The sector is an important contributor to the country’s export activities, with
markets in America, Europe, Africa and the Far East. According
to Scoones et al (2010), the sugar industry has been the mainstay of the
lowveld’s economy; the industry has produced significant foreign exchange for
the national exchequer not to mention employment, ethanol and various
industrial products.[9]
According to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA),
Zimbabwe’s sugar cane production is projected to fall by 3% in MY 2014/15 to
3.8 million tonnes, due to a 12% drop in the area harvested. It notes that
improved yields prevented a more dramatic fall, and that as a result overall
sugar production in Zimbabwe is expected to fall by just 8,000 tonnes, to
480,000 tonnes. Around 80% of sugar cane produced comes from the Triangle and
Hippo Valley estates, in which Tongaat Hulett enjoys a 100% and 50.3%
shareholding, respectively. The remaining sugar cane production comes from
Green Fuel, large-scale farmers and newly resettled farmers. The Successful
Rural Sugar Cane Farming Community project aims to expand farmer-supplied cane
from 800,000 to 1,400,000 tonnes, on the basis of a loan-financed revolving
fund supported by Tongaat Hulett, and a local bank and technical services
(tillage cane replanting extension support), designed to improve cane yields
and sucrose content.
Since 2010/11, Zimbabwean sugar production has increased by 44%,
from 333,000 to 480,000 tonnes, with yields per hectare increasing by 40%, from
6.2 to 93 t/ha. Sucrose extraction has also grown in the last 2 years. Total
sugar consumption in Zimbabwe declined slightly in 2013/14 to 340,000 tonnes.
However, sales of locally produced sugar were reduced to 180,000
tonnes in the face of increased imports from lower-priced world market
suppliers, which reached 124,639 tonnes. These imports also pushed down local
sugar prices (wholesale prices −18%; retail prices −11%). Imports largely
originated from South Africa (64,570 tonnes of refined and 41,468 tonnes of raw
sugar) with small volumes of raw sugar imported from Malawi (2,460 tonnes) and
Zambia (1,796 tonnes); 7,447 tonnes of raw sugar and 6,898 tonnes of refined
sugar were imported from beyond Southern Africa. In response to this situation,
from “17 January 2014 the government effectively stopped all sugar imports,
except for importation of white manufacturers grade sugar for the beverage
industry”. In 2014/15, Zimbabwean exports to the EU are expected to remain at
about 200,000 tonnes, the same level as in 2013/14.
Zimbabwe:
Sugar production, consumption, imports, exports and ending stocks (tonnes)
|
|
MY
2012/13
|
MY
2013/14
|
MY
2014/15
|
|
Sugar
production
|
475,000
|
488,000
|
480,000
|
|
Human
consumption
|
389,000
|
340,000
|
350,000
|
|
Total
imports
|
78,000
|
124,000
|
10
|
|
Raw
exports
|
201,000
|
200,000
|
200,000
|
|
Ending
stocks
|
70,000
|
142,000
|
82,000
|
Source: USDA [10]
3.2
Pacesetters and new risk takers
3.2.1
Triangle Limited
Triangle
Limited is an agri-based sugar company and is wholly owned by The Tongaat
Hulett Group. Murray MacDougall, assisted by Tom Dunuza founded the company in
1919 to ranch cattle but a severe downturn in the economy during the post World
War 1 recession led Triangle into crop production in the late 1920s. The main
crop cultivated was wheat but Triangle started growing sugar cane in 1934 with
only 18 hectares under irrigation. The first sugar-processing mill in Zimbabwe
was opened at Triangle on 11 September 1939. Numerous problems followed, which
saw the Government taking over the company in 1944. In 1954 a South African
company, the Natal Syndicate purchased Triangle, only to be taken over in 1957
by Guy Hulett who was running a business consortium in Natal. This marked the
beginning of the Tongaat Hulett association with Triangle. Triangle's expansion
was started in the early 1960's, with the development of water storage and
conveyance infrastructures for the irrigation of sugar cane. The Triangle operation is the biggest sugar operation
in Zimbabwe, with crushing capacity of around 2.5M tonnes of cane per year and
producing up to 300,000 tonnes of raw sugar per year. In addition, an alcohol
plant attached to the sugar factory produces up to 25M litres of industrial
grade rectified spirit from molasses annually, for sale predominantly into the
regional market. The alcohol plant
takes the final molasses from the sugar production operation and then through a
fermentation process followed by distillation and molecular sieve dehydration.
This process produces fuel grade alcohol at a rate of 120,000 litres per day.[11] Triangle also established Mwenezana Sugar Estates in Mwenezi
District, Masvingo Province to grow sugar cane on about 4000 hectares.
3.2.2
Hippo Valley
Estates
Hippo
Valley Estate was established in 1956 as a citrus estate and soon it diversified
with the first cane planted three years later in 1959. Canned Hippo Valley
fruit was exported across southern Africa until the 1970s. In the wake of the
sugar marker crush in 1975, the estate initiated irrigation programs to water
its sugar plantations. In 2006 Anglo American sold its 50.4 percent stake in
Hippo Valley Estates to Triangle Sugar, the Zimbabwean unit of Tongaat-Hulett. Hippo Valley, the country’s second largest operation,
is listed on the local bourse. The company produces approximately 50% of the
local sugar industry output and has a mill with an annual capacity of about
2.4m tonnes of cane at an average cane: sugar ratio of 8:1. Hippo can also
produce up to 300,000 tonnes of raw sugar during a year of normal rainfall. In
addition to sugar, the mill produces molasses, which is a by-product of the
process. Molasses is used as an ingredient for stock feed and for the
production of alcohol. The baggasse produced during the milling season is
used for the generation of electricity, producing at most 30 megawatts at
optimum capacity.[12]
3.2.3
Mkwasine Estates,
Chapiwa and Mpapa
Mkwasine -- which measures over 8 200 hectares, was
previously owned by a consortium run by the two Lowveld sugar cane growing
giants, Triangle and Hippo Valley Estates. It was then acquired by the
government under the fast Track Land Reform Programme with the acquisition
being part of the Government's thrust to find ways of increasing the sugar
production. Mkwasine Estates was acquired under the land reform programme as part
of deliberate moves by Government to open up the lucrative sugar cane farming
industry to indigenous people. At the moment, there are over 200 resettled
sugar cane farmers. Mpapa has 17 farmers with 35ha each and Chapiwa is a
resettled scheme where the farmers have 10ha each.
3.2.4
Chisumbanje
and Middle Sabi Estates (Green Fuel)
|
|
The land that Green Fuel’s sugar cane is cultivated on belongs
to the Agricultural Rural Development Authority of Zimbabwe (ARDA). ARDA was
formed in 1981 under the Zimbabwean Ministry of Agriculture, Development and
Irrigation with the aim of merging several different government authorities
into one body. ARDA’s core focus is on the development of community farming
by providing education and management services to small-scale farmers on both
communal land and property purchased by the government. There are 6000ha
under sugar cane at Chisumbanje Estates (Macdom) with a potential of 45 000ha
to be put under sugar cane for ethanol production. The Middle Sabi Estate
(Rating) account for 3 500ha under sugar cane.
The major source of water for the plant is Osborne
Dam which is an earth embankment dam, creating a reservoir with a surface area
of 2600 hectares, storing 400,000 mega litres on the Odzi River, a
tributary of the Save River. The catchment area is 1392 km² the embankment is 66 metres high,
crest length 1007 metres and the volume of earth in the embankment is 5.1
Million cubic metres. The spillway is the "drop inlet" type with a
crest radius of 15.7 metres, a 6 metre diameter shaft and conduit conveys the
overflow to the flip bucket. However, there are plans for the construction of
Kondo dam as there are challenges in water supply.
There have been disagreements between Green Fuel and
the Zimbabwe National Water Authority, with the company being disconnected
over failure to pay for the water supplies. The community has also been in
disagreements with the company over the distribution of water in the 0.5
irrigation schemes where the community claim that the company prioritise
their own use at the expense of the community. The company has built the
Matombo Dam Reservoir for the community irrigation schemes but sometimes the
community go for months without water in the schemes.
|
4.
CONTESTATIONS IN SUGAR INVESTMENTS IN CHISUMBANJE
4.1
Acquisition of land in communal areas
The Chisumbanje ethanol project is a
unique project in that it acts contrary to the Fast track Land Reform Program
that took land from white farmers for re-distribute to the black poor farmers,
the state has supported the removal of rural households from what the people of
Chisumbanje consider their communal farming land (Thondhana 2014). Biofuels
development activities have acquired communal land, despite the fact that such
land is integrated into rural communities livelihood practices, which depend on
agriculture and natural resources (Cotula and Vermeulen 2009). This trajectory
of land acquisition is in sharp contrast with the new wave of twenty first
century global land reform, which aimed to redress insecurities from colonial
policies that arose in the twentieth century (Hall 2011). Among the fundamental
concerns was the land that falls under communal land was acquired by the
private investors for commercial purposes.
There are concerns in the manner in
which the private investor acquired land under customary use and ownership for
the investment. Most displaced farmers reported that they were neither
consulted nor formally advised about the land acquisition agreements or before
the land clearance commenced. On the sidelines of the political discussion,
community issues ranged from allegations of forced relocation of families to
the failure of providing fair compensation for the land taken by the project –
including those under the state agency ARDA. At the height of the crisis
between the company and the communities in Chisumbanje and Chinyamukwakwa,
Cabinet set up the District Ethanol Project Implementation Committee (Depic)
comprising traditional chiefs, area legislators, the district administrator,
councilors, police, members of the President’s office, and community
representatives, including NGOs (Platform for Youth Development). The Depic was
working towards resolving problems between the company and the communities.
4.2
Displacement discourse
and its contestation
It is alleged that most displaced farmers
complained that they were neither consulted nor formally advised about the land
acquisition agreements or before the land clearance commenced (Focused Group
Discussion, Chisumbanje, May 2014). The coming of Green Fuel is said to have
seen one thousand and eight (1008) farmers losing their land that ranged from
2ha-40ha to the company and out of the 1008 from Chisumbanje; only 172 farmers
were compensated with 0.5ha irrigation schemes per family.[13] A key informant interviewee noted that:
The coming
of Green Fuel saw one thousand and eight (1008) farmers losing their land that
ranged from 2ha-40ha to the company and out of the 1008 from Chisumbanje; only
172 farmers were compensated with 0.5ha irrigation schemes per family. The
company had slashed down crops that belonged to the farmers during land
clearance and takeover and only compensated the farmers with US$3.00/ha. Now
the community is failing to send their children to school because they do not
have the land to till and have no jobs. The few who have been employed are not
being paid up; employees at Green fuel have gone for more than three months
without pay despite the company now selling the ethanol produced.”[14]
The interviewee then pointed out that the
community was failing to send their children to school because they do not have
the land to till and have no jobs, the few who have been employed are not being
paid up; employees at Green fuel have gone for more than three months without
pay despite the company now selling the ethanol produced.[15] However, the consultations were confirmed to
the chief, Chief Garahwa and the Chipinge Rural District Council, and the
ethanol project went ahead without the people’s approval. According to Chief
Garahwa, though the company brought about irrigation schemes as compensation to those that lost
their land several problems bedevil the whole issue.
“The
first issue is that the people here are not used to irrigation plots hence the
reluctance to accept such plots and in the beginning people were resisting
such. The second issue is an issue of compensation itself, those that lost
their crops were not adequately compensated and out of the over 1000 people
that lost their land in Chisumbanje only 172 were compensates with the 0.5ha
irrigation plots. We expect the investment to benefit the community to a
greater extend since it took land away from the community changing the
livelihood patterns of the local people. However this seems not to be happening
as the company is no-longer fulfilling its promises. My people expected to be
involved in the sugar cane production as out growers or contract farmers, but
as of now only a few people are involved in sugar cane production as outgrowers
and I have been asking the company to provide me with a list of the outgrowers
but nothing has been done so far. As the Chief I recommend the company to go
back to the promises they made from the beginning and improve on their
relationship with the community for the investment is of national strategic
importance.”[16]
What shocked the community was that
the company “acquired 40 000ha” of land that included land belonging to
settlers who had valid lease agreements with ARDA and land that belonged to the
community under communal land without any form of consultation, and asked about
the lack of consultation in a meeting that was between the company and the
community, the Green Fuel Assistant General Manger, Raphael Zuze, said, “What do you have that we were to consult
you and who are you? We consulted the chief and the DA!”[17] According to the local MP, to enter into the
joint agreement, the company used correct channels, those who matter were
approached. People knew the boundaries of ARDA, ARDA did not have sufficient
resources to utilize the land and villagers occupied the idle land and ARDA
simply reclaimed its land. Even the greater Chisumbanje plan showed need for
expansion. That is why people did not build in the estate, they only did
farming. However, people were not given adequate notice, an all stakeholders
meeting was supposed to have been conducted, and no enough notification was
given.[18] There was also the use of intimidation and
disrespectful attitude of the investor supported by state agencies such as the
police (Thondhlana 2014).
4.3
Conflicts over land
allocation to communities
In Chipinge the conflict involves Agriculture and
Rural Development Authority (ARDA) in partnership with Green Fuels versus
communal as well as resettled farmers who have land offer letters on ARDA land.
Some of the issues at the center of the conflict include displacement, poor resettlement plans where the communities
have been allocated a uniform 0.5 ha per family which is not adequate
for others and compensation of
households that lost crops in the process of developing the project’s dams and
canals. The owners of the project at Chisumbanje have tried to
involve and compensate the farmers who lost their land. Macdom Investment set
aside 0.5 ha irrigated portions of land for smallholder farmers to engage in
horticulture projects to compensate for their losses. The company provides the
farmers with irrigation services and gives them logistical support.
Furthermore, 241 farmers are also contracted by the company to grow sugarcane,
which they sell to the company.
4.4
Conflicts over
“favourable” land allocation to war veterans
There are
6000ha of land under sugar cane in Chisumbanje Estate (Macdom Investments)
where there are 116 outgrowers under 410 ha of land and 125 war veterans under
250ha of land.[19] The company then buys sugar cane from the
farmers at US $4/tone and the expected yield per hectare is 135tonnes. In
Middle Sabi, the company is utilizing 3500ha of original ARDA land with no
displacement of the community, and there is a plan to develop 6000ha in Middle
Sabi for the out grower scheme under the A2 model.[20] The allocation of “significant” amount of
land seem to be interpreted by communities that Green Fuel wanted to curry
favour with the company for political reason. However, this seems to have back
fired, as the war veterans were then accused by the communities of being sell
outs.
As can be deciphered from War Veteran 4 in box 3.1,
there seems to be conflicts of war veterans and the general population. There
is no question that the company provided more land and support to war veterans
than the ordinary people. They could afford this because the war veterans were
fewer, could be the source of conflicts and negative mobilisation that would
disrupt the project and by policy on land, all allocations need to meet 20%
quota in terms of the number of plots or the size of land, which ever applies.
Therefore, the company was within the policy parameters to provide such
concessions. However, the communities seem to then accuse the war veterans of
selling out and being the spokespersons of the company given the benefits
preferred on them.
|
Box 3.1: Story of War Veteran 4
I shall
speak on behalf of the war veterans and not focus on the community at large.
As war veterans we went to war mainly to claim back our land. We did not want
to be located on unfertile rocky territories. So as each person went to war,
we had the mindset of coming back home to be located on fertile land.
Historically we were told that in Chisumbanje we would be located in the far
unfertile territories and we objected to this under the notion that we had
fought for the land. This relocation we believed was being caused by the
Smith regime so after the war no one was relocated to the unfertile
territories of Masvingo and we remained on our land. ARDA had its own
territory and we were clearly aware of these boundaries. As war veterans come the era of land
invasion, we decided not to go to Masvingo or any other area but we wanted to
concentrate of attaining our benefits from our local area. We invaded ARDA
state land and said we wanted the government to give us land portions in that
territory. Letters were written and sent to the MLRR and it was agreed to
have land apportioned at DRC, located further up from ARDA. People got
between 3-5 hectares.
War Veteran 4 indicated that they
were content but we were then told that we shall consider you as candidates
for state land that shall be distributed later. So when the company then came we were
already benefiting and we were told not to cultivate in that area and as war
veterans we complied to this request as we were told that we would be given a
place to cultivate together with our community. We agreed to this as this was
a project that was said would benefit the locals and nation at large. A lot of promises were made inclusive of
dam construction, hospital construction, irrigation set up, and that we would
be part of the out grower scheme. We gladly welcomed this and although they
ploughed down our crops they said that they would compensate us. Some people
had about 5 hectares of land with cotton being destroyed; maize was put in a
scotch cart and sold. With that having been done and over time we assessed as
war veterans the progress of the company in terms of helping us. We decided
to demonstrate and we called upon the community and their response was that
you as war veterans were the ones whose land was taken and as a result you
need to go and stand for yourselves and we do the same. Little did they know
that the company started getting land from us the war veterans and were going
to spill-over to the rest of the community.
The community was reluctant to
listen to us and we then proceeded to go and demonstrate by ourselves as war
veterans. I thought it was clear that I highlight the history of the land
distribution that ended up happening as the rest of the local community could
say to you that war veterans are the ones that benefited the most from this
investment. The community did not agree to assist us and we started to make
arrangements as a team of about 500 war veterans all the way from Chipinge
South and other wards not only Chisumbanje. We set down with the company and
we referred them to the initial promise they made to us that they would
consider to give us state land. They offered to make us out growers and they
took a group of 125 war veterans first.
Each was given 2 hectares of planted sugarcane. From this benefit, it is necessary to
assess the benefits of these 2hectares given to the people. This is a
challenge. All we were told was we have 2 hectares not that we know specifically
where these 2 hectares are or what it takes to cultivate this land.
Source:
Focused Group Discussion, Chisumbanje on 14 May 2014
|
A War Veteran Representative said that the Chisumbanje
ethanol investment is tantamount to colonization, and villagers suggested a
halt to their operations until they consulted displaced communities[21]. In spite of having
been accused of wanting to close down the company project through their
actions, war veterans holding protection-for-community-benefits frames are
typically careful to point out that they are not “against the project”.
4.5
Women’s land rights in
the context of “displacement”
The investment affected women and men differently,
which necessitates taking gender as a mediating factor in the Chisumbanje
ethanol project. However, by gender profiling, there is a miss of the actual
effects of the project on women (Behrman, et
al., 2011.), given the skewed rights that in African set up places men far
ahead of resources ownership and access as compared to women. This is not new,
and Paradza (2010) by examining the communal areas challenged the received
wisdom that women are always disadvantaged, because there is an overt
mi-interpretation and misrepresentation of African family structures and the
division of labour, and how resources are shared in the family set up. In fact,
in any family hardly is the fact of who owns what really matters when it comes
to looking after families. These matters only arise when the family is
dissolved due to divorce or death of a male spouse, which sets it cultural
methods of handling property, which in any case has transformed in the last few
decades. The heir to property is the son, but is given responsibility for the
whole family left behind, hence the concept of ownership become trite.
Nonetheless, in families where there are girl children, interference from other
family members seem to be a key issue, though it may not be as widespread as in
the past.
A dominant thesis around gender in Africa is that on
any land deal, poor rural women loose out because they do not have reliable
access to land, secure land tenure, or customary land rights (Gaidzanwa, 1985, 1995).
Yet, Matondi, (2012) also found that where the state has done a “land deal” in
the form of the FTLRP, women have largely lost out not just land, but a second
best when it comes to the resources to use the land. Investments in
mega-projects on customary lands, shifts household dynamics in terms of their
roles, income-generation activities, and property rights. However, a surprising
finding was that women in Chisumbanje were not lobbying for access to
irrigation plots or lost land as to be “their” personal property, but rather
for their spouses who had been pushed out or incorporated in small sized land
of 0.5 hectares and very far from their places of residency. Green Fuel land,
has therefore not contributed to shifts on gender property rights, but has affected
the rights of family property, which brings together families to lobby against
the company. This material point has been missed in most of the gender type of
analysis in most of the studies to date, of which below I present evidence of
what women were contesting.
The major change in land and resources tenure positively
affected women greatly, as family units broken in the past by lack of economic
opportunities were being reconstructed. Prior to the land investments, the poor
rural women of Chisumbanje and Chinyamukwakwa often had reliable access to
land, secure land tenure, or customary land rights, and could do what they like
with minimal support from spouses. As witnessed by the Zimbabwe independent (2013)
during a tour they “….came across George Chinyamukwakwa
(42), his wife Elizabeth Makuyana (28), their two sons Lovemore and Robert,
harvesting their maize crop. They were working together in their field, an
increasingly rare phenomenon in a Zimbabwe whose high unemployment levels have
driven many across the borders in search of the proverbial greener pastures
while tearing families apart”[22]. However, not every
woman has been pleased with the project. While they acknowledge that some work
was done in the community (e.g. bridge construction), women pointed out that it
was not intentional development for the community. They indicated that it was
way to get water to the other side of the bridge, and communities benefitted by
accident.
Women reported to be living in Chisumbanje and their
farms are in the area taken by company. Their own version is that some of the
people lost land ranging from 3-10 ha, while in allocations they did not get irrigable
land. Yet, historically some were farming on the plots since 1983 and in 1998,
yet others had only started with new families in 2006. Women in FGDs, also
pointed out that the loss of land affected everyone, as the children of
traditional leaders lost their land, yet other were accommodated in the war
veterans section. The distance (30 kilometres away) to the new plots and size
of the land were raised is contested matters. Yet, the authorities promised
that the land was for temporary use, without any specifics or anything written
down. Everyone who got and in the irrigation, got 0.5 hectares, everyone, and
the biggest problem are it’s more than 30km away. You travel for the better
part of the day, it’s too far away. They said they men would be given sugarcane
farms and this 0.5 hectares was meant for the women. The dams at the irrigation
do not have water, plus they are located at the margin of the sugarcane
plantation. Biggest problem is a small part of the community got the 0.5, so
other members of the community have no incentive to take care of their animals.
The villages that were affected are Masunde, Bepe, Masunde, Madwayi,
Zuwarekipi, and Vhutuza. The company made us the security fence for their
sugarcane, they used as buffer. Out of 1060, only 172 got plots, so those with
cattle and they did not get acres, will simply let their animals free.
4.6
Conflicts and resolution
of compensation
In Chisumbanje the issue of
compensation is double faced: first compensation for lost lands is contested;
second compensation for lost produce as the Company admitted to having ploughed
crops belong to the community. Communities have raised issues of their crops
having been destroyed by the company. It is not clear, why this destruction
took place, and whether there was agreement between the company and the
communities for the destruction to happen. It is also not clear, if all the
destroyed crops were compensated for or not, and how the company and the
community planned for food security parameters. The company seem to have
acknowledged and admitted its culpability in the destruction of the crops as
they gave the following statements:
The company through their Human
Resources Manager Mr.Zuze agreed that they
are responsible for the destruction
of crops belonging to the residents
since 2008,” we are consulting with
Agritex to establish the value of the
destroyed crops so that we start
compensation” Zuze admitted. This statement
was made at a meeting at
Chisumbanje on the 18th of August. More than one
thousand villagers including
Chief Garahwa, Headman
Chisumbanje,Chinyamukwakwa and Matikwa attended[23].
However, an important point to observe is that the company was not
strategic in its handling of the crop that was on the land targeted for
production as directed by ARDA. Instead of taking a hard-line stance, it would
have been proper to negotiate directly with the communities, allow them to
harvest and then carried out awareness programmes on the precise areas where
the company was planning to plant the following season,. This would not have
encouraged the politicisation of the issue, and could have fostered better
relations between the company and the community. The GNU in 2012, waded into
the issue and provided recommendations:
The Company should
immediately compensate and resettle the 117 households that had offer letters
and were displaced from ARDA estates. With Government and ARDA supervision, the
Company should engage the farmers directly and pay the compensation in lieu of
the land user rights that were lost, and negotiate terms for the farmers to
continue to live on the estates as out-growers and producers to the Ethanol
Project. Of the 117 farmers who held sub-leases in ARDA estates, 116 have
stayed on as out-growers of sugarcane to the Project. Their major grievances
have been non-payment of compensation for land user rights and slow payment for
cane delivered to the project in the 2010/2011 season. Of the total, US$196,800
due to the farmers for that season, US$161,800.00 had been paid and US $35,000
was outstanding and was only paid on 14th September, 2012. All payments to
these farmers are effected through ARDA. With Government and ARDA supervision,
the Company should go into direct arrangements for payment of these farmers,
and should avoid delays in paying for crop deliveries (Mutamba Press Statement,
2012).
It seems that prior planning was not participatory, as communities
should have been aware that certain parts of the land they were using were
targeted for sugarcane production. Such targeting needed to be specific on the
timing and announcing when the land would be needed by the company so that
communities will not commit resources (finance, seeds, fertilisers, chemicals,
tillage and labour) only to see this ploughed by the company. Acknowledgement
on its own is not enough, because compensation needed to be paid as affirmed by
the Mutambara (2012) mission. However, there seems to be no follow up
discussion of how this lost land (used for securing food security) mean for the
future food requirements of the community.
4.7
Conflicts over production
relations post land transfer
The ARDA Chisumbanje Settler Scheme
Farmers (116) signed an MoU with Macdom Investments (Private) Limited, where
Macdom developed the out grower’s land and established a sugar cane crop
thereon and has been maintaining the crop together with the land and its
appurtenant works. The out growers have agreed to re-imburse Macdom for all the
capital expenditure incurred in the development of the land and sugar cane crop
as well as all maintenance and operation costs associated.[24] The total amount the outgrowers in
Chisumbanje owe to Macdom in development and maintenance fees is USD2.4
million, which the outgrowers will pay through a stop order for a period of
three years. However after the three seasonal years the outgrowers will chose
either to sell to Macdom of any other company that buys sugar cane. Under the
agreement, Macdom is obligated to supply water for irrigation purposes as well
as other seasonal inputs as agreed by the parties from time to time necessary
for the production of mercantile quality sugar cane on the out grower’s plot.
According to Raphael Zuze, there are
116 outgrowers under 410ha of land and 125 war veterans under 250ha of land in
Chisumbanje.[25] However the model is a unique model in that
the farmers are not much involved in the production but they are just land
owners and the company does everything for them and pays them at the end of
every harvest. This is because the farmers do not have expertise in the
production of the expected quality of the sugar cane required for the
production of ethanol. However, there are inconsistencies when it comes to out
grower schemes, in an interview one out grower lamented,
“When
they cut the sugar cane we asked the position about our fields and we sought
audience with the investor, but the investor said ARDA did not tell me that
there are settler farmers within the land, but promised to give us back our
land and the sugar cane after the first ratoon. When he harvested the first
harvest we then asked about the position of our fields but nothing concrete
came out of it. As we speak, the company owes us more than $300 000 for three
seasons which were not paid. When we ask he said, he is not selling the ethanol
so he cannot pay. Now that he is selling again he is not paying”[26]
The company buys sugar cane from the
farmers at US$4/ton and the expected yield per hectare is 135tonnes. In Middle
Sabi, there is a plan to develop 6000ha in Middle Sabi for the out grower
scheme under the A2 model.[27] Though there was an agreement over the
$4.00/ton selling price there has been issues as the out growers are now
comparing with Triangle and Hippo Valley outgrowers that are being paid $7/ton,
a difference of $6/ton and the farmers are not yet paid the $4/ton since 2010.[28] Under the MoU, Macdom admits that it still
owes the farmers USD178, 000.00.[29]
4.8
Does the Chisumbanje
ethanol project fit a land grab?
A thorough analysis of
the global trends in land investment and Zimbabwe’s own investment policy shows
that it would seem that the Chisumbanje ethanol project does not fit the land
grab discourse of the international dimension mentioned above for a variety of
reasons. Though, issues of land displacement have been raised and lack of
community beneficiation is key, it seem from the interviews of various
stakeholders, including local communities are not in agreement. First the Green
Fuel Company points out that it is leasing land from ARDA, and has no say on
any land related matter, and only waits for instructions from ARDA on where to
plant sugarcane. Government therefore has the strongest say on land ownership,
of which then issues that arises on land related matters should be addressed by
government and not the company.
Second, government is
a shareholder in the project with the same rights as Green Fuels Company, which
is the reason why ARDA is central in the project. ARDA claims that it has more
land in the area that it has not been using for generation and had ceded the
land on a temporary basis for the use by communities. This on its own does not
take away the ownership rights of the land and the communities are said to have
been aware of this arrangements for generations. However, a problem then arises
that for generations, communities have established themselves on state land,
and their removal would seem to be too harsh, which is the reason why delicate
and sensitive negotiations have to take place.
Third, it is
critical to engage traditional chiefs, yet in the case of Chisumbanje there has
been contradictory statements from the traditional leadership. Therefore
building their capacity to conversation is key, which the international
guidelines could be helpful. It would seem, that Chief Garahwa was more
concerned with the promises made that the land issue. In an interview noted
that when Green Fuel came in, they made promises to him as a chief and to the
community as a whole, which they are now not fulfilling and the investment is
no longer benefiting the community as promised when the company came in.
According to Chief Garahwa problems aroused when ARDA invaded peoples land,
when it was common knowledge that ARDA had its own land which was fenced and everyone
knew the boundaries. During the process of the invasion of people’s land, the
company destroyed crops which were ready for harvesting. Though these crops
were compensated, it was not to the delight of the local people. Headman
Chisumbanje presiding over 16 villages with 10 of
the 16 affected by the land displacement carried out by Macdom Investments,
pointed out that people used to grow maize for food and cotton as a cash crop
and we were able to build our houses using proceeds from cotton. During better
seasons we would sell excess grain to the GMB. Now that most families have lost
their land we can no longer grow food and cotton for sale, even our cattle do
not have anywhere to graze.
However, the Chief and the Headman
admitted that they were consulted on behalf of the community and that is why he
carried a traditional ceremony to bless the investment and has been taking all
the problems that have risen to the District Administrator. While
the truism, in this intervention showed that indeed there where contested land
issues, and that communities had been displaced and compensation was required,
it remains to us trite to regard the displacement in the same mould as what is
happening elsewhere. While displacement is displacement, some would argue, the context
needs to be put in its right perspective. First it is the manner in which such
displacement takes place that requires interrogation, in this case the state is
blameworthy because it was in charge of directing where Green Fuel could go. It
therefore remain erroneous and disingenuous to blame the company that has no
land literally to say. Second, it also has to be put in context that the
company has not refused land compensation, and has cited several constraining
in the overall project performance, which government had responsibility for.
For instance,
by agreeing to a massive potentially displacing project, without dealing with
the high market end of the ethanol value chain meant that the company was
squeezed between the politics of Zimbabwe, could not produce and generate
resources for the compensation of the communities that the same government was
insisting on. Thirdly, it would seem that the former Deputy Prime Minister by
going hard on the company, seemed to have lost the fact that in fact ARDA (and
government parastatals under his government) had approved all the plans and was
in the forefront of land “giveaway”. It boggles the mind, why the Deputy Prime
Minister did not engage the parastatals responsible for land and with
significant shares, based on the land resource.
This context needs to be taken seriously beyond the international
agreements (voluntary or otherwise) to address the needs of the communities.
Yet, such solutions needs to be provided in a context of non-confrontation and
politicisation of a potential national project with economic benefits as seen
through the related investments that have come courtesy of the ethanol
production by Green Fuel that the communities are not disputing.
4.9
Ethanol blending: the
noise and confusion
The
project is alleged to be run by a figure close to ZANU PF and by the
governmental Agriculture and Rural Development Authority (Arda), it
is, as everything else in the country, a subject of a heavy politicized
agenda. Among arguments made in the debate were the company’s failure to comply
with the government’s indigenization program which requires a majority of
national ownership, a discussion about the potential negative impact of
the gasoline/ethanol mixture on car engines to fuel prices, the Green Fuel’s
monopoly on ethanol (being the country’s sole ethanol producer) along with the
introduction of national legislation mandating the gasoline/ethanol mixture,
which not only underlines policies to save on oil imports but also the amount
of revenues the company would see when such legislation was mandated.
In
August 2013, the Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority (ZERA) introduced an E5
blending, that is 95 percent gasoline and 5 percent ethanol, which in October
2013, and it increased to E10. For a project that experienced very recent and
enormous difficulties, the current situation is a complete change of direction
in the country’s energy policy. The company’s future plans include the
establishing of four more ethanol plants to be supplied by 46,000 hectares of
sugarcane (from the current 10,000 h), with a combined annual capacity of 1.5
billion litres of ethanol. The most common argument from the public is that
ethanol burns faster and therefore reduces the coverage of kilometers per litre.
They also argued that there is need to bring back unleaded so that there is a
choice where if one needs unleaded then one buys and if one needs blend the do
so. One motorist in Greencroft alleged that blend was damaging his car, a
Mercedes Benz inscribed strictly unleaded. So many motorists are not aware of
the fuel they are using especially female motorists with most of them not
knowing that this country has a mandatory blending policy.[30] According to
Mutambara (2012) “Some of the consumers’
negative attitudes to ethanol are based on sheer ignorance and fear of the
unknown. In fact, from a review of the history of fuel blending before
independence up to 1992, there is no evidence of vehicle damage due to the use
of ethanol blends. Furthermore ethanol technology and quality has improved
since then, and so has car technology towards compatibility with ethanol blends”.
The benefits of ethanol blends and the associated personal, community, national
and environmental advantages must be clearly articulated in a massive branding
and marketing campaign.
4.10
Disputed economic
empowerment issues in the sugar sector
A
hotly contested issue in Chisumbanje where the Macdom has got 90% ownership
while the government through ARDA retains the remaining 10% The community on the
other hand is crying foul over the 10% community share ownership scheme.
However negotiations among the concerned parties have already opened, although
differences in approach on the shareholding determinants have emerged at the
centre of the negotiations. However, according to Robson Nyakurwa[31]
the machine together with its installation and the total investment cannot cost
US$600 million (the initial amount of the investment that was being cited in
the press) as purported by the company, comparing the machine to the one which
was set up by Zimplats at its platinum mine. The machine is a second hand
machine that was designed by M. Dedin and was once assembled and used in Brazil
at an ethanol plant along the Mississippi River.
4.11
Environmental contestation
There are
contestations over water pollution with the community pointing out that the
company did not carry out an environment assessment and that they are spilling
venice into Jerawachera river, affecting aquatic creatures and livestock
actually dying because of this. The company refutes such claims arguing that it
has carried out an environmental assessment exercise. However observations by
the research team reveal that the water in Jerawachera is actually dirty and
aquatic creatures are actually dying from the affluent spilled into the river.
Proper ground mapping
of deforestation based on time series will need to be done in future, to
compare the situation before and after. At the same time, it will be critical
to carry out an assessment of the forest resources that the communities have
lost, because these were used for a variety of multi-purposes, commercial,
nutrition and also cultural. The company has embarked on a re-forestation
exercise where they document every tree that was destroyed during land clearing
and for every one tree destroyed, they replace with two trees planted.
5.
FROM PERCEPTIONS OF EXPLOITATION TO ECONOMIC HAPPINESS
IN CHISUMBANJE
5.1
Core business of Green
Fuel
There
are 6000ha of land under sugar cane in Chisumbanje Estate (Macdom Investments)
where there are 116 outgrowers under 410ha of land and 125 war veterans under
250ha of land.[32]
The company then buys sugar cane from the farmers at US $4/tone and the
expected yield per hectare is 135tonnes. In Middle Sabi, the company is utilizing
3500ha of original ARDA land with no displacement of the community, and there
is a plan to develop 6000ha in Middle Sabi for the out grower scheme under the
A2 model.[33]
The ethanol plant produces 300 000 to 350 000 litres of ethanol every day,
depending on the supply of cane, which is a significant proportion to
Zimbabwe’s daily consumption of 1.2 million litres of petrol.[34] According to the Zimbabwe Energy Council,
‘Zimbabwe imports 30 to 40 million litres of petrol every month and this
decision by government to invest in ethanol will save the country between 1, 5
million and 2, 5 million litres which will translate into $2 million dollars
every month. This is a great saving for a country that is hit by a high import
bill.’ [35]
The investment in ethanol production and the mandatory blending has reduced the
price of fuel from $1.50 a litre to as low as 85 cents if it is E100, or $1.47
if it is E10. The ethanol project has got a potential of opening the
possibility of a motor manufacturing plant using Brazilian technology.[36]
The project can be a sustainable home
grown solution towards energy security and the nation could make significant
savings on its national import bill. The first three months of ethanol blending
saw Zimbabwe fuel import bill cut by nearly US$20 million. (Herald, 1 Jan
2014). According to the Energy Minister, the project is saving the country US$9
million per month in fuel imports (Herald, 17 January 2014). Currently the
plant is producing 30 000-35 000 litres of fuel per day depending on the supply
of cane and is producing 15 mega watts of electricity with 3 mega watts used to
light up the plant and 12 mega watts being pumped in the national grid. Green
fuel is the first company to invest in a processing plant in Chipinge South,
there were no other companies based there except for cotton companies (buying
depots). Green fuel was the first industry to come into the constituency to do
farming and processing of sugar cane into ethanol. According to the local MP
for Chipinge South, the investment feed into almost every cluster of ZIM ASSET
(Zimbabwe’s new economic blue print 2013-2018), particularly the beneficiation
(they grow sugar cane and value add by turning it into fuel (ethanol). There is
value addition. There are also other by-products like electricity generation.
The electricity is already being generated. The plant is a typical case of ZIM
ASSET agenda.
5.2
Technology and multiplier
effects
The production at Chisumbanje is
highly technological with nearly everything done by machinery. The company uses
large Magnum tractors for land clearing and GPS leveling. For planting they use
what they call laser guided planting and when the cane is still young they use
machines for fertilizer application, however they use flood irrigation for
irrigation in Chisumbanje while they use overhead irrigation in Middle Sabi.
All the cane at Green Fuels is harvested by a Magnum Harvester and there is no
manual harvesting. The spill-over from Chisumbanje ethanol project should in theory bring
technology transfers, upgrading of domestic production, quality improvements,
employment creation, backward and forward linkages and multiplier effects
through local sourcing of labour and other inputs and processing of outputs,
and possibly increased food supplies for the domestic market and for export.
However, these benefits will not flow if investments create enclaves of
advanced agriculture in a dualistic system involving traditional smallholder
agriculture where smallholders cannot emulate the techniques and methods of
large-scale agriculture. One could go even further, since such investments may
also undermine or alienate smallholders through conflicts over land rights
(Matondi et al. 2011; Cotula 2013:2).
The ethanol plant turbine generator produces 15 megawatts of electricity with 3
megawatts used at the plant to power the mill and the compounds and the
remainder is pumped into the national grid through a 33kv power line that
connects to the Mkwasine Sub-grid[37].
The company is producing a lot of carbon dioxide which is currently not being
captured and it can capture the carbon dioxide produced and use it to produce
carbonated drinks or export and currently there are interests from Delta
Beverages as well as Boc Gasses.[38]
Another aspect of
technical change in agriculture that needs to be watched is the mechanization
of sugarcane production, which can lead to labour redundancy and increased
exploitation of the labour remaining in the sector. The possibilities of
intensifying sugarcane production can intensify their efforts to increase their
productivity at the expense of other crops, and in general world wide it is
women who tend to suffer from loss of access to subsistence land, loss of
incomes, and unhappiness and rise in suicides as studies show in the case of
the cotton boom in Gokwe in the 1980s.
5.3
Social transformation in
Chisumbanje: for the better and for the worse
The survey we carried out in
Chisumbanje showed that all the respondents who were not directly affected by
the ethanol plant (did not lose their land), i.e. business owners, informal
traders, bricklayers, carpenters and welders felt that the project brought
increased opportunities for local development as evidenced by more banks, the
emergency of small businesses (small grocery outlets, furniture and hardware
shops, fuel stations and hair saloons), increased downstream job opportunities,
housing construction and general improvement in the standard of living (less
frequent power cuts, more reliable mobile networks and transport), (Thondhlana
2014). According to Headman Chisumbanje, it cannot be disputed that the plant
despite creating problems for the people has brought about some sort of development to the community.
Prior to the plant there was only POSB and Agri-bank in terms of banks but now
there is BANCABC, CABS, CBZ and ZB. Though we had shops that sold all wares
including hardware prior to the investment, these shops have increased[39].
The investment has boosted social
investments in education, health and technology in the community with the
company through its community social responsibility programme having built a
community library that will host internet services for the community and a
community sewing workshop where ten members of the community have stated
producing work suits for sale to the company at Takwirira.[40] The ethanol plant
is tipped to become the backbone of the provincial economy through
infrastructural development, power generation, food security and employment
creation. (The Financial Gazette, 5 Dec 2013)The project has received overwhelming
endorsement from politicians, the business community, traditional leaders and
villagers as the new source of provincial and national development. However,
the economic vibrancy has brought about social ills such as, increase in corruption,
increase in violence and crime, lack of work security, labor absenteeism,
firings, unemployment, loss of livelihood, loss of traditional
knowledge/practices/cultures, militarization and increased police presence,
Social problems (alcoholism, prostitution, etc.). According to interviews
carried out, the community is failing to send their
children to school because they do not have the land to till and have no jobs
hence an increase in prostitution as a means for survival.
5.4
Dynamics of (mis)
understood transformation: from cash crop to cash crop
According to interviews with the
community, the investment has done more harm than good to the community. The
community relied on farming as its key livelihood activity, with farmers
growing cash crops and food crops way before Green Fuel came into the area. The
community used to grow cotton as a cash crop and cotton companies used to have
depots at the local business centers where they provided farmers with inputs
and buy the cotton from them. This has seen a boom in the local economy with
people being able to build better houses for themselves as well as a boom at
Checheche growth point where shops that include banks, hardware, grocery shops,
car sales and many other services established. Many parents were able to send
their children to school through cotton production and produced food crops with
excess grain being sold to the Grain Marketing Board. At the initial stage the
company had employed a lot of locals with figures of those employed by the
company rising up to 1000. Greater problems came in 2011 when the company
closed due to the low uptake of ethanol in the country and the politics that
were characteristic of the GNU era, many locals were retrenched and when the
mill re-opened they were either replaced by whites or blacks from other
regions.[41]
Chief Garahwa expected the investment to benefit the community to a greater
extend since it took land away from the community changing the livelihood
patterns of the local people. However these seem not to be happening as the
company is no-longer fulfilling its promises.[42] A
key informant interviewed had the following to say:
“The so
called investment has done more harm than good to the community. The community
relied on farming as its key livelihood activity, with farmers growing cash
crops and food crops way before Green Fuel came into the area. The community
used to grow cotton as a cash crop and cotton companies used to have depots at
the local business centres where they provided farmers with inputs and buy the
cotton from them. This has seen a boom in the local economy with people being
able to build better houses for themselves as well as a boom at Checheche
growth point where shops that include banks, hardware, grocery shops, car sales
and many other services established. Many parents were able to send their
children to school through cotton production and produced food crops with
excess grain being sold to the Grain Marketing Board. The coming of Green Fuel
saw one thousand and eight (1008) farmers losing their land that ranged from
2ha-40ha to the company and out of the 1008 from Chisumbanje; only 172 farmers
were compensated with 0.5ha irrigation schemes per family. The company had
slashed down crops that belonged to the farmers during land clearance and
takeover and only compensated the farmers with US$3.00/ha. Now the community is
failing to send their children to school because they do not have the land to
till and have no jobs. The few who have been employed are not being paid up;
employees at Green fuel have gone for more than three months without pay
despite the company now selling the ethanol produced.”[43]
According to Chief Garahwa, though the
company brought about irrigation schemes as compensation to those that lost
their land several problems bedevil the whole issue.
“The
first issue is that the people here are not used to irrigation plots hence the
reluctance to accept such plots and in the beginning people were resisting
such. The second issue is an issue of compensation itself, those that lost
their crops were not adequately compensated and out of the over 1000 people
that lost their land in Chisumbanje only 172 were compensates with the 0.5ha
irrigation plots. We expect the investment to benefit the community to a
greater extend since it took land away from the community changing the
livelihood patterns of the local people. However this seems not to be happening
as the company is no-longer fulfilling its promises. My people expected to be
involved in the sugar cane production as out growers or contract farmers, but as
of now only a few people are involved in sugar cane production as outgrowers
and I have been asking the company to provide me with a list of the outgrowers
but nothing has been done so far. As the Chief I recommend the company to go
back to the promises they made from the beginning and improve on their
relationship with the community for the investment is of national strategic
importance.”[44]
According to Raphael Zuze, there are
116 outgrowers under 410ha of land and 125 war veterans under 250ha of land in
Chisumbanje.[45]
However the model is a unique model in that the farmers are not much involved
in the production but they are just land owners and the company does everything
for them and pays them at the end of every harvest. This is because the farmers
do not have expertise in the production of the expected quality of the sugar
cane required for the production of ethanol. However plans are at an advanced
stage to involve Chinhoyi University of Science and Technology to train the
outgrowers so that they grow sugar cane for ethanol production on their own.
The company buys sugar cane from the farmers at US$4/tone and the expected
yield per hectare is 135tonnes. In Middle Sabi, there is a plan to develop
6000ha in Middle Sabi for the out grower scheme under the A2 model.[46]
However, there are inconsistencies when it comes to out grower schemes, in an
interview one out grower lamented,
“When
they cut the sugar cane we asked the position about our fields and we sought
audience with the investor, but the investor said ARDA did not tell me that
there are settler farmers within the land, but promised to give us back our
land and the sugar cane after the first ratoon. When he harvested the first
harvest we then asked about the position of our fields but nothing concrete
came out of it. As we speak, the company owes us more than $300 000 for three
seasons which were not paid. When we ask he said, he is not selling the ethanol
so he cannot pay. Now that he is selling again he is not paying”[47]
The ARDA Chisumbanje Settler Scheme
Farmers (116) signed an MoU with Macdom Investments (Private) Limited, where
Macdom developed the out grower’s land and established a sugar cane crop
thereon and has been maintaining the crop together with the land and its
appurtenant works. The out growers have agreed to re-imburse Macdom for all the
capital expenditure incurred in the development of the land and sugar cane crop
as well as all maintenance and operation costs associated.[48]
The total amount the outgrowers in Chisumbanje owe to Macdom in development and
maintenance fees is USD2, 400, 000, which the outgrowers will pay through a
stop order for a period of three years. However after the three seasonal years
the outgrowers will chose either to sell to Macdom of any other company that
buys sugar cane. Under the agreement, Macdom is obligated to supply water for
irrigation purposes as well as other seasonal inputs as agreed by the parties
from time to time necessary for the production of mercantile quality sugar cane
on the out grower’s plot. Though there was an agreement over the $4.00/t
selling price there has been issues as the out growers are now comparing with Triangle
and Hippo Valley outgrowers that are being paid $70/ tone, a difference of
$66/tone and the farmers are not yet paid the $4/ton since 2010.[49]
Under the MoU, Macdom admits that it still owes the farmers USD178, 000.00.[50]
5.5
Employment issues in the
sugar investments
There are 4500 workers working on the
agricultural departments of the company both in Chisumbanje and Middle Sabi and
300 people working on the mill who all work on two eight hour shifts per day.[51]
According to Ropafadzo, the according of town status to Checheche Growth Point
and the subsequent growth in infrastructure and a surge in services can be
attributed to the existence of Green Fuel.[52]
The company has got a monthly wage bill of US$1,5million and this only has
changed Checheche Growth Point which has now seen it having more banks than the
town of Chinhoyi.[53]
According to the local Member of Parliament, Enock Porusingazi, Green fuel is
the first company to invest in a processing plant in Chipinge South. There were
no other companies based there except for cotton companies (buying depots).
Green fuel was the first industry to come into the constituency to do farming
and processing of sugar cane into ethanol. It is the only company that employs
most people, and currently has 4500 workers that are drawn from all over the
country. According to the MP, Green fuel is most welcome as the company is
committed; however, between the years 2010 and 2013, there were problems
resulted in Green Fuel not operating. A lot of conflict within government,
especially the key Ministry of Energy and Power Development, resulted in Green
Fuel not being given a license (to facilitate mandatory blending). Therefore,
operations had to be halted resulting in a lot of people being retrenched.
The company has got a monthly wage
bill of US$1,5million and this only has changed Checheche Growth Point. The
company has employed 4500 workers so far in its agriculture and the processing
plant, with 70-75% of the workforce drawn from the locals. 300 people out of
the 4500 work on the mill and there are differences in terms of payments as the
payments are based on the sector, with the minimum wage for the agricultural
sector ranging from $80-100 while that of the mill is pegged at $1800. However
due to political reasons local resisted taking up jobs at the plant but now
they are complaining that the company do not employ locals.
According to the local community, at
the initial stage the company had employed a lot of locals with figures of
those employed by the company ranging up to 1000. Greater problems came in 2011
when the company closed due to the low uptake of ethanol in the country and the
politics that were characteristic of the GNU era. The locals were retrenched
and told to pray for the country to pass a law that push for mandatory
blending, night vigils and fasting were held at the plant so that the plant
reopens. When the Ministry of Energy and Power Development enforced the 10%
mandatory blending there was the restoration of hope on the community not
knowing that it was not going to be the same. The locals who have been
retrenched were replaced by either whites or blacks from other regions. The few
locals employed by the company are doing menial jobs and very few are in
management. Allegations of only whites being promoted have been raised, the
company started with two whites in management in 2009 and now the number has
risen to more than ten.
The community complains that
recruitments are done in Harare at the company’s headquarters and this has shut
out on the locals. According to one
local person interviewed, the locals are said not to be educated, which is not
true, Chipinge has got so many educated and trained people who should be
employed by the company). The company
recruits more people from other regions even as laborers. “Do the job of
weeding, irrigating require the company to recruit someone from Gutu -a place
outside Chipinge?” The local MP is of the view that locals should constitute
the majority of those employed by Green Fuel. In an interview, he admitted that
there used to be more blacks in management; however, the number of white
managers has increased:
“There were very few whites when the
project started but the number has gone up (from 2 to around 20 in the agric
department, former white farmers). However, the human resources practitioner
ought to be a black person because the majority is blacks. The majority
shareholder is a white and in any business one may want to have a person who
he/she trusts. The white managers are former farmers, local Zimbabwean farmers,
some of whom lost their farms. The farmers are indigenous whites, one Jeremy
Dyke was farming in Rusape, one was in Mutare, and one was in Beitbridge. Since
they came to work they should concentrate on working, leave politics, and
racial discrimination. So far there is no problem.”
Given the high
rates of unemployment in Zimbabwe, we also examined the types of jobs on offer
in terms of the opportunities and lack of in the economic investments. During construction in 2009 the company
recruited more than 1000 locals mainly as assistants to the technical people,
and most of them were trained on the job as artisans, boiler makers and many
others jobs. At the initial stage the company had employed
a lot of locals with figures of those employed by the company ranging up to
1000. Greater problems came in 2011 when the company closed due to the low uptake
of ethanol in the country and the politics that were characteristic of the GNU
era. The locals were retrenched and told to pray for the country to pass a law
that push for mandatory blending. Night vigils and fasting were held at the
plant so that the plant reopens. When the Ministry of Energy and Power
Development enforced the 10% mandatory blending there was the restoration of
hope on the community not knowing that it was not going to be the same. The
locals who have been retrenched were replaced by either whites or blacks from
other regions. The few locals employed by the company are doing menial jobs and
very few are in management.
Only whites
people were said to be promoted, the company started with two whites in
management in 2009 and now the number has risen to ten. Recruitments are done
in Harare at the company’s headquarters and this has shut out on the locals. Decisions made on labor do not get input from
the locals as was promises when the company first opened. Corruption and
nepotism are the order of the day and locals have to pay clandestinely to the
recruiting officer for them to get a job. Some pay in the form of goats or
forfeiting ones pay for a month or so depending on the type of job one is
looking for. Recruitments are now done in Harare at the company’s headquarters
thereby disadvantaging the locals who lost their land. To those local who lost
their jobs, they are being replaced by former white farmers and you wonder
whether it is a solace to the white farmers who lost their land during the
FTLR. (Field notes)
According to a member of the workers
committee who remained anonymous[54],
safety measures for the worker are not adequately followed; the boiler is not
under roof posing a danger to the workers who do not have adequate safety wear
with the last issuance of uniforms and safety shoes being 2009. What baffles the worker is that there is a
sure market of the product but no improvements on the working conditions.
Workers were last paid three months ago. There are allegations that there is no
legal code of conduct for the workers and workers are being forced to join the
Zimbabwe Sugarcane Workers Union though they belong to the energy sector and
should join the Zimbabwe Energy Workers Union.
5.6
Broader national socio-economic benefits on the sugar
value chain
The Chisumbanje Ethanol Project is going to change the way we look
at fuel consumption in Zimbabwe, especially with the introduction of mandatory
blending. The question many would want to know is the impact of mandatory fuel
blending on our economy. Fuel is currently our biggest import, amounting to
about US$2 billion per annum. The Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority (ZERA)
said the current mandatory blending at E10 will see the country saving US$4
million per month. Government plans to reach a mandatory blending of E20, which
implies even more savings. Other countries like Brazil are already on a
mandatory blending of E24. The main benefit of fuel blending is that it reduces
dependence on foreign oil and increases the nation’s energy independence. High dependence
on foreign petroleum supplies puts Zimbabwe at risks of trade deficits, supply
disruptions and price changes. That would reduce dependency on foreign fuel
imports and vaccinate the nation against unstable price rises. Oil prices rose
by 150 percent over the past decade, from US$40 per barrel in 2003 to more than
US$100 per barrel. Blending can therefore make us less vulnerable to these
external shocks.
Ethanol
is good for the environment as it produces lower carbon monoxide and carbon
dioxide emissions and it also improves fuel octane. E10 reduces greenhouse gas
emissions by 12 to 19 percent. Ethanol production would cover domestic
consumption, and the balance will be exported to regional markets. Such project
includes the construction of the Kondo Dam that would be the biggest inland dam
in Manicaland. Therefore the mandatory blending of E10 is that it has seen
Chisumbanje Ethanol Project being able to generate electricity from baggasse (a
cane by-product) amounting to 15 megawatts -- sufficient to power about 30,000
households, with 3 megawatts used to light up the plant and the reminder pumped
into the national grid through the Mkwasine sub grid. When the project reaches
its peak, it would generate 50 megawatts of electricity, capable of powering about
90,000 households. This would help reduce the energy deficit woes the country
currently faces.
Further, the project is employing 4 500 people in the agriculture
and mill sector and is expected to create about 10,000 jobs – making ethanol
production one of the single largest job creation ventures in recent years. The
Chisumbanje community is set to benefit, as 10 percent of the project’s land,
or 4,000 hectares, is being allocated to individual farmers to try out cane
farming. A number of downstream industries -- including fertilizer manufacture,
the cosmetics industry, explosives and beverage makers are also likely to
benefit from the venture as the plant produces a lot of carbon dioxide which
can be harvested. Checheche has been
issued with town status and in a way it can be accrued to the coming in of
Green Fuels which has created a business boom at Checheche. Due to a lot of
people being employed, there has been a shortage of accommodation at Checheche
and there is a company that servicing stands for residential purpose.
6.
CONCLUSION
The
Chisumbanje ethanol development project is a strategic investment at the
national level. Ethanol development in Chisumbanje is premised upon the
development of “marginal” and “unproductive” land to generate benefits such as
energy security and independence, efficient irrigation schemes, smallholder
out-grower schemes, job creation, electric power generation and the stimulation
of downstream industries. Most local people, particularly displaced farmers,
felt they had been left worse off than they would be without the bio-fuel
investment. There is a clear collision between national interests and local
communities in Chisumbanje. The state envision bio-fuel development as a
pathway to development — an economic opportunity to energy independence, while
the locals see it as a threat to their livelihoods. Rather than being merely
“marginal” or “unproductive,” the land appropriated for ethanol development was
crucial for land based livelihood activities such as food- and cash-crop
farming, livestock production and direct natural resource use among other
income sources (Thondhlana 2014). Some of these income sources were reported to
be increasingly insecure due to recurrent droughts, for example, maize crop
farming. However, other drought-resistant crops such as sorghum, and activities
such as cotton farming and livestock production represented a buffer against
fluctuations in other income sources.
(Benjaminsen et al. 2006; Hall 2011; Nalepa and Bauer 2012) stipulate
that lands perceived as marginal by the state and large private investors do,
in most cases, provide a vital basis for the livelihoods of poorer and
vulnerable groups. Thus, the ethanol policy processes and direction should be
informed and guided by the realization that dry land communal farming system in
Chisumbanje has multiple production objectives, which are part of local ways of
adapting to income stresses.
Political
and private interests may underlie the seemingly noble shift towards ethanol
production, which breeds winners and losers in emerging ethanol development
projects (Shattuck 2009). The Government of Zimbabwe may have been especially
keen to satisfy the needs of ethanol investors, because they are the few
private investors that were prepared to sidestep international concerns about
the country’s political problems. Thus, from a policy perspective, it is also
important to understand the political configurations that shape pro-ethanol
production arguments. Further, the extent to which national policy legal
frameworks provide adequate safeguards for local land and resource access
rights, and effective mechanisms for local participation in decision making,
will frame whether increased ethanol investments and initiatives will translate
into new opportunities for or further marginalization of local communities.
More powerful individuals and groups of people have greater access to resources
such as irrigated land.
The trajectory of the
Chisumbanje case revealed that the investors are struggling to have a balanced
model in relation to fair compensation to the local people for land and losses
in crops. The Chisumbanje case reflects that the immense potential
opportunities anticipated in diverting a natural resource such as land and
water from the small scale farmer to the large scale commercial farming project
require greater stakeholder coherence in approach to address design elements,
while working collaboratively to ensure that no one party of prejudiced.
Empirical study of the Chisumbanje case shows that there are both positive and
negative consequences of the project. There is a compelling case for more
grounded community development approaches beyond the company for the local
people to secure their livelihoods. The locals feel disempowered for now and
more marginalized, despite some of them getting menial jobs. In the long-term,
there is a need for an incremental development approach to level the playing
field for a win-win situation for the company and the local communities, only
if and when dialogue commences across the actors.
7.
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[1] Here a community may
loose land rights, but can regain livelihoods through having access to water
and technology. Yet, the company my loose when government does not allow for
the retailing of ethanol on an investment that they would have allowed thus contributing
to company losses.
[2]Southern African Development Community,
2011. Regional Agricultural Policy - Country Summary Agricultural Policy Review
Reports, [pdf] Available at: <http://www.sadc.int/fanr/docs/rap/RAP Combined
Summary Reports- 8 May 2011.pdf < [Accessed
2012].
[3] Interview, Rafael Zuze (Assistant General
Manager) Green Fuel, 14 May 2014, Green Fuel Boardroom, Chisumbanje
[4] Interview, Rafael Zuze (Assistant General
Manager) Green Fuel, 14 May 2014, Green Fuel Boardroom, Chisumbanje
[10] USDA, ‘Zimbabwe Sugar
Annual’, 15 April 2014 http://www.thefarmsite.com/reports/contents/ZimbabweSugar28April2014.pdf
[19] Interview, Rafael Zuze (Assistant General
Manager) Green Fuel, 14 May 2014, Green Fuel Boardroom, Chisumbanje
[20] Interview, Rafael Zuze (Assistant General
Manager) Green Fuel, 14 May 2014, Green Fuel Boardroom, Chisumbanje
[21] Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Youth,
Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Public Hearing on Chisumbanje Ethanol
Plant, Chisumbanje, Chipinge District, 11 July 2014
[22]Herbert Moyo, 2013. Ethanol project: the other
side of the story, 13 December, The Zimbabwe Independent, Harare.
http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2013/12/13/ethanol-project-side-story/
[23]Chisumbanje villagers furious over lack of
consultation for Ethanol project: http://swradioafrica.com/pages/ethanolproject230811.htm
[24] MoU, Macdom Investments (Private) Limited and ARDA
Chisumbanje Settler Scheme Farmers, 27 September, 2013
[25] Interview, Rafael Zuze (Assistant General
Manager) Green Fuel, 14 May 2014, Green Fuel Boardroom, Chisumbanje
[27] Interview, Rafael Zuze (Assistant General
Manager) Green Fuel, 14 May 2014, Green Fuel Boardroom, Chisumbanje
[28] Elson Maara, Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on
Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Public Hearing, 11 July 2014,
Chisumbanje Primary School, Chisumbanje
[29] MoU, Macdom Investments (Private) Limited and ARDA
Chisumbanje Settler Scheme Farmers, 27 September, 2013
[32] Interview, Rafael Zuze (Assistant General
Manager) Green Fuel, 14 May 2014, Green Fuel Boardroom, Chisumbanje
[33] Interview, Rafael Zuze (Assistant General
Manager) Green Fuel, 14 May 2014, Green Fuel Boardroom, Chisumbanje
[34] Interview, Tafadzwa (SHE Manager), Green
Fuel, 14 August 2014, during a tour of the plant in Chisumbanje
[36] Address to Parliament, Deputy Prime
Minister of Zimbabwe, Arthur Mutambara, Harare, Zimbabwe, 20 February 2013.
[37]Interview, Rafael Zuze (Assistant General
Manager) Green Fuel, 14 May 2014, Green Fuel Boardroom, Chisumbanje
[38]Interview, Ropafadzo Gwanetsa (Community
Officer) Green Fuel, 14 August 2014, during a tour of the plant in Chisumbanje
[40]Interview, Ropafadzo Gwanetsa (Community
Officer) Green Fuel, 14 August 2014, during a tour of the plant in Chisumbanje
[45] Interview, Rafael Zuze (Assistant General
Manager) Green Fuel, 14 May 2014, Green Fuel Boardroom, Chisumbanje
[46] Interview, Rafael Zuze (Assistant General
Manager) Green Fuel, 14 May 2014, Green Fuel Boardroom, Chisumbanje
[48] MoU, Macdom Investments (Private) Limited and ARDA
Chisumbanje Settler Scheme Farmers, 27 September, 2013
[49] Elson Maara, Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on
Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Public Hearing, 11 July 2014,
Chisumbanje Primary School, Chisumbanje
[50] MoU, Macdom Investments (Private) Limited and ARDA
Chisumbanje Settler Scheme Farmers, 27 September, 2013
[51] Interview, Ropafadzo Gwanetsa (Community
Officer) Green Fuel, 14 August 2014, during a tour of the plant in Chisumbanje
[52] Interview, Rafael Zuze (Assistant General
Manager) Green Fuel, 14 May 2014, Green Fuel Boardroom, Chisumbanje
[53] Interview, Ropafadzo Gwanetsa (Community
Officer) Green Fuel, 14 August 2014, during a tour of the plant in Chisumbanje
